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CUSTODIAN OR NOT: SCRIVENER’S ERROR IN A
BANKRUPTCY CODE SAFE HARBOR
Thomas E. Plank*
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes a drafting error in the United States Bankruptcy Code
that remained latent for 36 years until 2020. This drafting error limits a safe
harbor that Congress enacted in 1984 and expanded in 2005 to protect an
important segment of the securities and mortgage loan markets.
When a person becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code
imposes an automatic stay on substantially all actions by creditors and other
entities against the debtor or the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. It also abrogates
contractual provisions, known as ipso facto clauses, that otherwise permit a
party to terminate a contract because its counterparty filed a bankruptcy
petition. In most cases, these rules produce a net benefit. Congress, however,
has determined that, because of the nature and importance in the financial
markets of certain qualified financial contracts, the costs imposed by these rules
outweigh their benefits. In particular, Congress enacted specific safe harbor
provisions for “securities contracts," which are contracts for the purchase and
sale of securities and mortgage loans. These safe harbors permit a financial
institution (a) to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate the securities contract
immediately if the counterparty became a debtor in bankruptcy and (b)
notwithstanding the automatic stay, to exercise immediately its rights under any
security agreement or its rights of set off and netting.
A financial institution as defined includes not only a banking institution or
trust company but also includes a customer of a banking institution or trust
company that acts as a custodian for the customer. Congress intended to extend
the safe harbor to customers who used a banking institution or trust company as
a custodian in the ordinary sense of the word—a person holding securities or
mortgage loans for another. Unfortunately, the drafters of the safe harbor were
*
Joel A. Katz Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. A.B. 1968,
Princeton University; J.D. 1974, University of Maryland School of Law. I have benefitted both professionally
and financially serving as issuer’s counsel, bankruptcy counsel and UCC counsel for sales and securitization of
mortgage loans and other consumer and business receivables, first as a partner with Kutak Rock LLP from 1987
to 1994, then as a consultant for law firms, and currently as Of Counsel to Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. The
views expressed in this Article are my personal views informed by my practice experience as well as my research
and analysis of the issues and are not the views of Morgan Lewis or any other law firm for which I serve or have
served as a consultant.
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not aware that the Bankruptcy Code had already given the term “custodian” a
narrow and misleading definition— a “Humpty-Dumpty definition.” As defined,
a “custodian” is, in the words of the legislative history, a prepetition liquidator
such as an assignee for the benefit of creditors or other receiver or trustee
appointed to liquidate the property of a borrower that later becomes a debtor in
bankruptcy.
The use of this misleading Humpty-Dumpty definition of a prepetition
liquidator in the definition of financial institution produces an absurd result. It
nullifies the intended extension of the securities contract safe harbor to a
customer that uses a banking institution or trust company as a custodian of the
securities or mortgage loans. This use of this misleading defined is a true
scrivener’s error that permits courts to ignore the plain language of the statute.
This Article argues that courts should ignore this misleading definition of
“custodian” in the definition of financial institution. Instead, they should give
the term “custodian” its commonly understood, ordinary meaning. They can
easily add a simple judicial amendment comparable to other Bankruptcy Code
definitions that specify the ordinary meaning of a defined term as an exception
to an express technical meaning.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes a drafting error in the definition of “financial
institution” in the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 This drafting error limits the
safe harbors that Congress enacted to protect an important segment of the
securities and mortgage loan markets.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a financial institution may immediately
terminate a contract for the purchase and sale of securities or mortgage loans—
a “securities contract”2—if a party to the contract becomes a debtor in
bankruptcy.3 A financial institution may also immediately exercise its rights
under any security agreement or its rights of set off and netting, and it is exempt
from the bankruptcy trustee’s power to avoid prepetition preferential or
constructively fraudulent transfers.4 These advantages arise from specific
exemptions in the Bankruptcy Code—safe harbors—from the application of
three provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that generally affect non-debtor parties
in a transaction: (i) the abrogation of ipso facto clauses, which are provisions in
a contract or law that permit the termination or modification of rights of a party
if that party becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, (ii) the automatic stay of most acts
against the debtor and the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and (iii) the bankruptcy
1
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Star. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532).
2
See 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A) (2018).

“[S]ecurities contract” (A) means–(i) a contract for the purchase, sale, or loan of a security, a
certificate of deposit, a mortgage loan, any interest in a mortgage loan, a group or index of
securities, certificates of deposit, or mortgage loans or interests therein (including an interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or option on any of the foregoing, including an option to
purchase or sell any such security, certificate of deposit, mortgage loan, interest, group or index,
or option, and including any repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction on any such security,
certificate of deposit, mortgage loan, interest, group or index, or option (whether or not such
repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction is a “repurchase agreement”, as defined in section
101).
Id. Securities contracts also include other agreements and transactions. Id. § 741(7)(A)(ii)–(ix). It excludes “any
purchase, sale, or repurchase obligation under a participation in a commercial mortgage loan.” Id. § 741(7)(B).
3
See id. § 555.
The exercise of a contractual right of a stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or
securities clearing agency to cause the liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a securities
contract, as defined in section 741 of this title, because of a condition of the kind specified in
section 365(e)(1) of this title shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of
any provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under
this title unless such order is authorized under the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970 or any statute administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Id.
4

See infra Part I.B.
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trustee’s power to avoid specific prepetition transfers of interests in property by
the debtor.5
One important type of securities contract is known in the marketplace as a
“repurchase agreement.” Under a market repurchase agreement, an entity that
owns securities or mortgage loans sells the securities or mortgage loans to a
buyer for a price and promises to repurchase the securities or mortgage loans at
a future date for a repurchase price equal to the initial purchase price plus
interest.6 If the seller becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, a financial institution,
whether acting for itself as buyer or pursuant to authorization from the buyer,
may immediately liquidate, terminate, or accelerate the securities contract and
sell the transferred securities or mortgage loans to third parties or to itself and
apply the liquidation proceeds to the repurchase price. The seller is entitled to
any surplus from the liquidation and is obligated to pay the buyer any deficiency
in recovering the repurchase price. The financial institution is entitled to the
benefit of the safe harbors for securities contracts.
A narrower form of market repurchase agreement, defined in the Bankruptcy
Code as a “repurchase agreement,” also enjoys safe harbors similar to those for
securities contracts. The use of the defined term “repurchase agreement” for this
narrower type of market repurchase agreement is unfortunate. It creates
confusion between what the market considers a repurchase agreement and what
the Code defines as a repurchase agreement.7 Specifically a “repurchase
agreement” as defined under the Code is an agreement for the transfer of federal
government securities, certain other specific obligations, and mortgage loans,
with a simultaneous agreement by the transferee to transfer to the transferor
those assets within one year after the transfer or upon demand.8 To differentiate
5

See infra Part I.A.
See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKT. ASS’N, Master Repurchase Agreement 1, ¶ 1 (Sept. 1, 1996),
https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MRA_Agreement.pdf (providing that the “parties hereto
may enter into transactions in which one party (‘Seller’) agrees to transfer to the other (‘Buyer’) securities or
other assets (‘Securities’) against the transfer of funds by Buyer, with a simultaneous agreement by Buyer to
transfer to Seller such Securities at a date certain or on demand, against the transfer of funds by Seller”).
7
See id. at 11, ¶ 19(a) (expressing intent that each transaction under the agreement is both a “repurchase
agreement” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code “except insofar as the type of Securities subject to such
Transaction or the term of such Transaction would render such definition inapplicable and a “securities
contract”).
8
The Code defines repurchase agreement as an agreement:
6

which provides for the transfer of one or more certificates of deposit, mortgage related securities
(as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), mortgage loans, interests in
mortgage related securities or mortgage loans, eligible bankers’ acceptances, qualified foreign
government securities . . . or securities that are direct obligations of, or that are fully guaranteed
by, the United States or any agency of the United States against the transfer of funds by the
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this narrower type of repurchase agreement from securities contracts, I will refer
to the defined repurchase agreement as a “Code repurchase agreement.”
Although encompassing a narrower range of transactions, a Code repurchase
agreement has one advantage over a securities contract. Any entity that is a party
to a Code repurchase agreement—a “repo participant”—has the benefit of the
safe harbors for Code repurchase agreements. Accordingly, the definition of
financial institution is not relevant to Code repurchase agreements.
Nevertheless, I also discuss the Code repurchase agreement because Congress
added the definition of financial institution, extended the safe harbors under
securities contracts to financial institutions, and added the full safe harbors for
Code repurchase agreements in the same legislation—the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 19849—for the same reasons.
In 2005, Congress added mortgage loans and interests in mortgage loans to
the assets that were entitled to safe harbor treatment under securities contracts10
and Code repurchase agreements.11 This addition made sense because of the
large size of the market for mortgage loans, which are generally sold at least
once and often more frequently. For example, as of December 2005, there were
approximately $9.4 trillion of single-family mortgage loans outstanding and
$12.1 trillion of total mortgages loans (home, multifamily, commercial and
farm) outstanding.12

transferee of such certificates of deposit, eligible bankers’ acceptances, securities, mortgage
loans, or interests, with a simultaneous agreement by such transferee to transfer to the transferor
thereof certificates of deposit, eligible bankers’ acceptance, securities, mortgage loans, or
interests of the kind described in this clause, at a date certain not later than one year after such
transfer or on demand, against the transfer of funds.
11 U.S.C. § 101(47).
9
See infra Part II.B. See generally Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-353, §§ 421, 441, 461, 463, 469, 98 Stat. 333 (1982 Supp. 2) (codified as amended 11 U.S.C. §§ 101,
362, 546, 548, 555).
10
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 907(a)(2), 119 Stat. 173–74 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C § 741(7)), quoted supra note 2. See
generally Thomas E. Plank, Toward a More Efficient Bankruptcy Law: Mortgage Financing Under the 2005
Bankruptcy Amendments, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 641, 659–65 (2007) [hereinafter Plank, Mortgage Financing Under
the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments] (describing the application of the safe harbors to mortgage loan financing).
11
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 907(a)(1)(C), 119 Stat. 171–72 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C § 101(47)).
12
See BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual Flows and
Outstandings 2005-2009 at 86, tbl. L.217, ll. 1 & 2 (Dec. 9, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/
20101209/annuals/a2005-2009.pdf.
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This volume was significantly larger than the outstanding balance of
marketable U.S. Treasury securities ($4.4 trillion).13 It was also significantly
larger than the outstanding balance of bonds of non-financial corporations ($3.0
trillion) and bonds of domestic financial entities ($4.7 trillion), although a little
smaller than the market value of total non-financial corporate equities ($12.7).14
Further, because of the nature of mortgage loans, that is, loans that amortize over
a period of 15 to 30 years, most originators of mortgage loans must sell the
mortgage loans to entities, including Fannie Mae (the Federal National
Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Association), that have access to long term financing. Pending sale of the
mortgage loans, however, mortgage loan originators need short term warehouse
financing for their originations. Repurchase agreements provide an efficient
source of such financing.15
As discussed below, without the bankruptcy safe harbors for securities
contracts (as well as Code repurchase agreements), a party to a securities
contract would become unable to exercise its rights if the counterparty became
a debtor in bankruptcy until the party could obtain relief from the bankruptcy
court or until the bankruptcy case ended. The purpose for exempting the
financial institution’s remedies from the abrogation of the ipso facto clauses, the
automatic stay and most of the bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers is to
protect the operation of the securities and mortgage loans markets.16
Sensibly enough, the Bankruptcy Code defines a “financial institution” to
include any bank, savings and loan association or federally insured credit union
or any trust company (or any receiver for such banking institution or trust
company).17 In addition, the definition provides that when a banking institution
or trust company is acting as an agent or custodian for a customer, the customer
is also a “financial institution.” In using the term “custodian” the drafters
undoubtedly meant a custodian in the normal sense of the word: a person that
takes custody of assets under a custody arrangement for its customer.18

13

See id. at 80, tbl. L.209, l. 3, 82, tbl. L.212, ll. 2 & 4, 83, tbl. L.213, ll. 2 & 4.
See Thomas E. Plank, Regulation and Reform of the Mortgage Market and the Nature of Mortgage
Loans: Lessons from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 SO. CAR. L. REV. 779, 794–99 (2009) (discussing
changes in mortgage market during the 1970s and 1980s that led to the savings and loan crisis and the necessity
for most originators to sell mortgage loans).
15
See Plank, Mortgage Financing Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, supra note 10, at 665–67.
16
See infra Part II.B (discussing legislative history for the safe harbor amendments).
17
11 U.S.C. § 101(22)(A), quoted infra note 126.
18
See, e.g., Custodian, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 347 (5th ed. 1979); see also infra Part II.B.3
(discussing legislative history on role of custodians in the normal sense).
14

PLANK_2.1.22

2022]

2/3/2022 1:49 PM

SCRIVENER’S ERROR

57

Unfortunately, the drafters of the amendments that enacted this particular
provision were not aware that the Bankruptcy Code already had a very narrow
and misleading definition of custodian. A “custodian” as defined in the
Bankruptcy Code is essentially an entity, like a receiver or an assignee for the
benefit of creditors under state law, that takes possession of some or all of the
assets of a person that later becomes a debtor in bankruptcy to liquidate those
assets and to distribute the proceeds to some or all of the person’s creditors.19
Congress included this defined term to provide a means of removing those
prepetition assets from the prepetition liquidator and bringing them into the
bankruptcy estate of the debtor and to address related issues, such as fees of the
custodian.
As discussed below, however, applying the defined term “custodian” as a
prepetition liquidator in the definition of financial institution, as a bankruptcy
court did in 2020,20 produces an absurd result. Under the provisions for the safe
harbors for securities contracts, no person for whom a custodian-liquidator were
appointed could ever exercise the safe harbor remedies or receive the benefits of
the safe harbors. Applying the defined term “custodian” renders this part of the
definition of financial institution meaningless. A true scrivener’s error.
This Article will first describe the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that
would apply to repurchase agreements without the safe harbors and then will
describe the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code for repurchase
agreements that are securities contracts. It then discusses the legislative history
for both the initial defined term “custodian” and the later addition of safe harbors
for financial institutions, including a non-financial institution for which a
financial institution acts as custodian. Finally, it analyzes the two drafting
mistakes that Congress made.
The first mistake was initially giving the word “custodian” a misleading,
Humpty-Dumpty meaning.21 The second mistake was later using the term in the
definition of financial institution in its well-known ordinary sense that had the
misleading, Humpty-Dumpty definition (as invariably happens with misleading
defined terms). Applying the actual defined term in the definition of financial
19

11 U.S.C. § 101(11), quoted infra in text accompany note 61.
See Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Pappa (In re Greektown Holdings), 621 B.R. 797 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 2020). In this case, the bankruptcy court rejected the argument that a non-financial institution was entitled
to protection from avoidance of an allegedly constructively fraudulent transfer because the payment was to a
financial institution because the financial institution was not a “custodian” as defined in the Code. Id. at 837.
The court noted that the transferee did not argue that use of the defined term, custodian, was unclear, absurd or
ambiguous. Id. at 835, 836.
21
See infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
20
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institution nullifies the express purpose of extending the safe harbors for
securities contracts to non-financial customers who used financial institutions as
ordinary custodians for the securities (and later mortgage loans) sold and to be
repurchased under the securities contract. Finally, this Article suggests several
simple modifications that correct the mistake. Because the mistake produces an
absurd result and a judicial amendment can easily fix it, this mistake is a true
scrivener’s error that justifies ignoring the plain language of the text and
applying the judicial amendment to the text.
I.

SECURITIES CONTRACTS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

A. The Limitations of the Bankruptcy Code
For over 400 years, bankruptcy law has sought to provide a more efficient
method of resolving the social and economic problems that arise when a
borrower does not have sufficient liquid assets to repay the borrower’s
unsecured creditors. The United States Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978,
provides for a generally efficient method by which a borrower may become a
“debtor” in bankruptcy22 for the purpose of liquidating its interests in property—
its “bankruptcy estate”23—under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or
reorganizing its business affairs and its capital structure under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. In a chapter 7 liquidation, a third party bankruptcy trustee
liquidates the debtor’s bankruptcy estate and distributes the proceeds generally
pro-rata to unsecured creditors.24 Under chapter 11, the debtor as the “debtor in
possession” has substantially all of the powers and duties of a bankruptcy
trustee25 and may continue to operate its business while it prepares a plan for
reorganization of its operations and its capital structure and for payment to the
22
See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (a debtor may seek relief from its creditors by filing a voluntary petition under the
Code); id. § 303 (a debtor may be subject to an involuntary petition by its creditors); id. § 109 (a corporation,
limited liability company or other legal person (other than a banking institution or insurance company) that has
a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States may be a debtor in bankruptcy).
23
See id. § 541(a)(1) (providing that the commencement of a case “creates an estate . . . comprised of all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”); see also id.
§§ 541(a)(3), (6), (7) (property of the estate also includes other items, including property recovered by the
bankruptcy trustee and property acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case).
24
See id. § 701; see also id. § 702; 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (appointment of trustee); id. § 363(b)(1) (trustee
power to use or sell property of the estate); id. § 725 (liquidation of property of the estate); id. § 726(b)–(c)
(distribution of proceeds of liquidation).
25
Id. § 1101(1) (“debtor in possession” means debtor or, in the rare instance, an independent trustee that
the court may appoint to replace the debtor as debtor in possession); id. § 1107(a) (providing that, with certain
exceptions, a debtor in possession has all the rights and powers and shall perform all the functions and duties of
a bankruptcy trustee); id. § 1108 (“Unless the court, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the debtor’s business.”).
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creditors, to be approved by most of the creditors and the bankruptcy court.26 In
addition, a debtor may file a chapter 11 petition to liquidate its assets and use
the plan for the distribution of the liquidation proceeds.27
Automatic Stay. To facilitate the liquidation or reorganization of a debtor in
bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code imposes limitations on the ability of creditors
and others to interfere with the bankruptcy trustee or the bankruptcy estate. One
of the most important of these limitations is the automatic stay of substantially
all causes of actions and acts against the debtor or the bankruptcy estate to collect
debts that arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Specifically,
under Section 362(a), the filing of a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy petition
operates as a stay, against all entities, of: (1) the commencement or continuation
of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case or to
recover a prepetition claim against the debtor; (2) any act to obtain possession
of property of the estate or of property from the estate, to exercise control over
property of the estate or to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property
of the estate; (3) any act to collect, assess, or recover a prepetition claim against
the debtor; and (4) the setoff of any prepetition debt owing to the debtor against
any prepetition claim against the debtor.28
For most borrowers that become subject to the Bankruptcy Code and for
most transactions by those borrowers, the automatic stay makes sense. If a
person operating a business that uses assets to generate revenue were to become
unable to pay its debts as they come due, it could not easily reorganize under the
Bankruptcy Code if secured and unsecured creditors could exercise their rights
and cause the assets to be seized and sold to pay the creditors. Also, the exercise
of creditor remedies could interfere with an efficient liquidation of the assets.
For example, in the case of a secured creditor that is oversecured, that is, it is
owed less than the value of the collateral, a foreclosure sale is likely to produce

26
See id. § 1121(a) (filing a plan); id. § 1123 (contents of plan); id. §§ 1126(b)(1)–(2) (disclosure and
solicitation of approval of plan); id. § 1126 (acceptance of plan); id. § 1127 (modification of plan); id. § 1129
(confirmation of plan); id. § 1141 (effect of confirmation of plan).
27
The Bankruptcy Code reorganization provisions expressly recognize the use of chapter 11 for
liquidation. See id. 1141(d)(3)(A) (providing that confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor that is not
an individual if the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the estate); id.
§ 1129(a)(11)–(12) (providing that the court may confirm a plan only if confirmation of the plan is not likely to
be followed by the liquidation or the need for further reorganization of the debtor “unless such liquidation or
reorganization is proposed in the plan.”); id. § 1141(d)(3)(A) (providing that confirmation of a plan does not
discharge a debtor if “the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the estate”
and certain conditions are met).
28
Id. §§ 362(a)(1), (3), (4), (6), (7).
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less value for the borrower’s other creditors than an orderly liquidation by the
bankruptcy trustee.
Nevertheless, the limitations on creditors—especially secured creditors—
imposed by the automatic stay does impose a cost on creditors. In the case of
secured creditors, these costs include the inability to realize on their collateral to
obtain payment, the loss of current cash flow on their loans and delays in the
ultimate payment of the debt owed to them. Creditors must recoup these costs to
remain profitable, and they do so by raising the cost of credit, that is, they
increase the interest rate.29
Ipso Facto Clauses. Under Section 365, the bankruptcy trustee, including
the debtor in possession in a chapter 11 case, may assume or reject the debtor’s
obligations under executory contracts.30 As long as the bankruptcy trustee
complies with the requirements of this section, a non-debtor party to the
executory contract cannot generally prevent assumption of the contract; the nondebtor will continue to be bound by the executory contract and must continue to
perform under the contract until it is rejected as long as the bankruptcy trustee
continues to perform.31 Further, the non-debtor party may not terminate or
modify an executory contract or the debtor’s rights under an executory contract
because the debtor becomes a debtor in bankruptcy.
Specifically, Section 365(e)(1) provides:
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired
lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or
obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated or
29
See Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1655, 1671 (2004) [hereinafter, Plank, The Security of Securitization].
30
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (also providing that the bankruptcy trustee may assume or reject leases). The
bankruptcy trustee may also assign executory contracts and leases that it has assumed. Id. § 365(f).
31
This result follows from the express terms of Section 365(a) giving the trustee the power to assume
executory contracts, other provisions of Section 365 and the provisions of Section 541(a)(1) and Section 363(c).
Generally, in a chapter 7 liquidation, rejection or assumption will occur relatively quickly, see id. § 365(d)(1),
but in a chapter 11 reorganization, the bankruptcy trustee—the debtor in possession—may assume an executory
contract at any time until confirmation of a reorganization plan, id. § 365(d)(2). The bankruptcy trustee has this
power even if the debtor has been in default if it cures the default or provides assurance of cure of the default.
id. § 365(b). A debtor’s rights under an executory contract become part of property of the estate under id.
§ 541(a)(1) even though those rights are contingent upon the continuing performance of the debtor’s obligations
under the contract. The bankruptcy trustee—specifically, the debtor in possession—continuing the debtor’s
business may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business under id. § 363(c)(1). The other party
cannot terminate the contract because the debtor filed for bankruptcy under id. §§ 363(l) and 365(e)(1).
Therefore, so long as the debtor in possession continues to perform its obligations under the contract, the other
party is obligated to continue its performance.
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modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely
because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned
on—
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at
any time before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under [the Bankruptcy
Code]; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in
a case under [the Bankruptcy Code] or a custodian
before such commencement.32

These provisions in Section 365(e)(1) and comparable provisions in other
sections33 are commonly called “ipso facto clauses.”
The abrogation of ipso facto clauses makes sense in most cases. For
example, under non-bankruptcy law, if a person is a party to a contract for the
purchase or sale of assets or services, and the contract is favorable to the
person—that is, the person will receive more under the contract than the cost of
performance—the counterparty is bound to continue to perform even though the
contract has become unfavorable. For example, under a contract for the sale of
widgets at twenty dollars a widget, if the market value of the widgets decreases
to fifteen dollars after the contract begins, the seller will receive a contract price
that is five dollars more than what it will cost the seller to perform, that is, to sell
the widgets. The buyer must pay twenty dollars for the widgets even though they
will be worth five dollars less than what the buyer pays.
If the seller becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, the positive value of the
contract is an asset that a bankruptcy trustee in a liquidation can sell for the
benefit of the debtor’s unsecured creditors or the debtor in possession in a
reorganization can sell or use as part of its reorganization efforts. Allowing the
buyer to terminate or to modify the contract because the seller became a debtor
in bankruptcy would permit the buyer to obtain a benefit of getting out of an
unfavorable contract that is not available under non-bankruptcy law.
On the other hand, requiring the counterparty to continue to perform its
obligations under an executory contract until there is a rejection of the contract
imposes costs. The counterparty must continue to incur the costs of being able
to perform–e.g., to manufacture shoes to be sold or to arrange standby financing

32

Id. § 365(e)(1).
See id. § 363(l) (trustee may use, sell, or lease property of the estate notwithstanding the application of
any ipso facto provisions); id. § 541(c)(2) (interests of the debtor become property of the estate notwithstanding
the application of any ipso facto provisions).
33
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to pay for shoes to be purchased—without knowing whether it will receive full
performance or merely a claim against a debtor in bankruptcy.
Also, the rules for calculating damages for rejection of an executory contract
give the debtor in possession in a chapter 11 reorganization an option and allows
it to play the market to the detriment of the counterparty. If a contract is
favorable to the debtor in possession because the cost of performance by the
debtor in possession at market value is less than the price that it receives under
the contract, the counterparty must continue to perform.34 The debtor in
possession need not assume the contract. If the market value of the performance
by the debtor in possession later increases and the contract price to be received
by the debtor in possession becomes less than the cost of performance, the debtor
in possession will generally reject the contract. If the debtor in possession rejects
the contract, the rejection constitutes a breach of the contract as of immediately
before the bankruptcy petition.35
More significantly, the counterparty’s damages for such breach would not
be determined as of the date of the rejection, when the counterparty will have
incurred actual damages. Instead, the damages would be determined as of the
commencement of the case.36 Because the contract at the commencement of the
case was favorable to the debtor in possession and unfavorable to the
counterparty, if the counterparty could terminate the contract at the
commencement of the case, the counterparty would be relieved from performing
a losing contract and would have no damages. Because the counterparty must
continue to perform a losing contract, however, if the debtor in possession later
rejects the contract when it becomes favorable to the counterparty, the
counterparty would not receive any damages.37
Avoidance of Preferential or Fraudulent Transfers. A bankruptcy trustee
may avoid several different types of transfers of property interests made by a
person that later becomes a debtor in bankruptcy.38 In particular, a bankruptcy
34

See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (providing that “the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease (1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this
section . . . immediately before the date of the filing of the petition”).
36
Id. § 502(g)(1) (providing that a “claim arising from the rejection . . . of an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor that has not been assumed shall be determined, and shall be allowed . . . as if such
claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition”).
37
See In re Enron. Corp., 330 B.R. 387, 392 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (denying a claim for rejection of an
executory contract to provide electrical power for $6,658,885, which was the amount of damages as of the date
of rejection and holding that because the buyer was paying more for the electricity at the commencement of the
case, a rejection as of that date would result in no damages).
38
In addition to avoiding preferential or fraudulent transfers discussed in the text, the bankruptcy trustee
35
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trustee may avoid a prepetition transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor within
ninety days before the filing of a bankruptcy petition if the transfer enables the
creditor to receive more than it would have received from a Chapter 7 liquidation
if the transfer had not been made.39 The typical type of prepetition preferential
transfer during the 90 days before the filing of a petition would be the payment
in full of a debt owed to an unsecured creditor or the grant of a security interest
to a previously unsecured creditor. Without such transfer, the unsecured creditor
would almost invariably receive payment of only a portion of the debt from a
chapter 7 liquidation. This power is intended to ameliorate the risk that creditors
may attempt to opt-out of the collective, pro-rata distribution scheme of
liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code.
In addition, a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a constructively fraudulent
transfer, which is essentially a prepetition transfer made by an insolvent debtor
for less than reasonably equivalent value.40 In addition, a bankruptcy trustee may
avoid a prepetition transfer made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
a creditor.41 A fraudulent transfer depletes the debtor’s prepetition assets without
decreasing the debtor’s prepetition debts and harms the debtor’s other creditors.
Because value is defined for purposes of fraudulent transfers to include
satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, payment or
securing a debt would almost always be reasonably equivalent value and would
almost never hinder, delay or defraud other creditors. Accordingly, a prepetition
payment or securing of an unsecured debt is generally not avoidable as a
fraudulent transfer but could be avoided as a preferential transfer.42
B.

The Bankruptcy Code Safe Harbors

For most companies and transactions, the benefits from the automatic stay,
the abrogation of ipso facto clauses and the trustee’s avoidance powers appear
to outweigh the costs. For some companies and transactions, however, the costs

may avoid unperfected prepetition transfers of property interests and the prepetition fixing of a lien on the
debtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a), 545.
39
Id. § 547(b)(1)–(5). Section 547(c) contains several exceptions to such avoidance, such as a
contemporaneous exchange for new value, transfers in the ordinary course of business, and other transfers. Id.
547(c).
40
See id. § 548(a)(1)(B). As provided in 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1), a bankruptcy trustee can also avoid an
incurrence of an obligation if it is actually or constructively fraudulent.
41
Id. § 548(a)(1)(A).
42
Id. § 548(d)(1).
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do outweigh the benefits.43 Specifically, Congress has made this determination44
for five different types of qualified financial contracts: securities contracts for
the purchase and sale of securities and mortgage loans,45 commodities contracts
and forward contracts for the purchase and sale of commodities,46 Code
repurchase agreements, and swap agreements.47 For these qualified financial
contracts, Congress has provided safe harbors from the operation of the
automatic say, the abrogation of ipso facto clauses, and most of the bankruptcy
trustee’s avoidance powers.
First, these safe harbor provisions provide that the exercise of a contractual
right of qualified counterparties to cause the liquidation, termination, or
acceleration of a qualified financial contract pursuant to an ipso facto clause
“shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any provision
of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding
under this title.”48
The parties who may exercise a contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or
accelerate the agreement pursuant to an ipso facto clause varies by the type of
qualified financial contract. For a Code repurchase agreement and a swap
agreement, any entity that is a party to the agreement may exercise this right.49
43
In addition to the repurchase transactions described in this Article, the automatic stay on secured
creditors that have a security interest in receivables imposes costs on those creditors and therefore on their
obligors on the receivables that are, in my view, unnecessary and that are avoided in securitization and structured
finance transactions. See generally Plank, The Security of Securitization, supra note 29, at 1660–71; 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(e)(1).
44
See infra Part II.B.1 & 2.
45
11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(i) (defining “securities contract”), quoted supra note 2.
46
Id. § 761(4) (defining “commodities contract,” which is primarily a specialized contract for the
purchase and sale for future delivery of a commodity, the trading of which is regulated under federal or foreign
law); id. § 101(25) (defining a “forward contract” primarily as a contract (other than a commodity contract) for
the purchase and sale of a commodity, as defined in § 761(8), or “any similar good, article, service, right, or
interest which is presently or in the future becomes the subject of dealing in the forward contract trade, with a
maturity date more than two days after the date the contract is entered into”); see also id. § 761 (providing all of
the definitions of terms describing the particular elements of a commodities contract).
47
Id. § 101(53B) (defining a “swap agreement” by reference to a large number and variety of specific
swap agreements, including an interest rate swap, currency swap, weather swap, total return, credit spread or
credit swap).
48
Id. § 555 (liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a securities contract, except if the debtor is a
stockbroker or securities clearing agency by an order authorized under the provisions of the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970 or any statute administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission); id. § 556
(liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a commodity contract or forward contract); id. § 559 (liquidation,
termination, or acceleration of a repurchase agreement, except if the debtor is a stockbroker or securities clearing
agency by an order authorized under the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 or any
statute administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission); id. § 560 (liquidation, termination, or
acceleration of a swap agreement).
49
Id. § 559 (liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a repurchase agreement by a repo participant,
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For securities contracts, however, the only party that can exercise this
contractual right is a “stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or
securities clearing agency.”50
Second, the damages arising from termination by the qualified counterparty
or rejection by the bankruptcy trustee of the qualified financial contract is
determined as of the date of the termination or rejection and not as of the date of
the bankruptcy petition.51 This exception to the Bankruptcy Code provision52
determining damages for rejection of ordinary executory contracts removes the
incentive of the bankruptcy trustee to obtain a benefit from an artificial
determination of damages as of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, which could
be before the date of the termination or rejection.
Third, several subsections and paragraphs of Section 362 exempt from the
automatic stay the rights of qualified counterparties to exercise any contractual
right under any related security agreement or to offset or net out any amount due
in connection with qualified financial contracts.53
Finally, a bankruptcy trustee may not avoid prepetition preferential or
constructively fraudulent transfers to financial institutions and other qualified
counterparties in connection with a securities contract54 and to other qualified

defined as “an entity that, at any time before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding repurchase agreement
with the debtor,” see id. § 101(46)); id. § 560 (liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a swap agreement by
a swap participant, defined as “an entity that, at any time before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding
swap agreement with the debtor,” see id. § 101(53C)).
50
Id. § 555. For a commodities contract or forward contract, the only party that can exercise this right is
a commodity broker, financial participant, or forward contract merchant. Id. § 556.
51
Id. § 562(a) (providing that “if the trustee rejects a [qualified financial contract] or if a [qualified
counterparty] liquidates, terminates, or accelerates such contract or agreement, damages shall be measured as of
the earlier of the date of such rejection or the date or dates of such liquidation, termination, or acceleration”).
52
See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
53
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) (commodity contract, forward contract, or securities contract); id. § 362(b)(7)
(repurchase agreement); id. § 362(b)(17) (swap agreement); id. § 362(b)(27) (master netting agreement); see
also id. § 362(o) (“The exercise of rights not subject to the stay arising under subsection (a) pursuant to paragraph
(6), (7), (17), or (27) of subsection (b) shall not be stayed by any order of a court or administrative agency in
any proceeding under [the Bankruptcy Code].”).
54
Id. § 546(e).
Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the trustee may
not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title,
or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this title, made by or to (or for the
benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution,
financial participant, or securities clearing agency, or that is a transfer made by or to (or for the
benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution,
financial participant, or securities clearing agency, in connection with a securities contract . . .
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counterparties in connection with other qualified financial contracts.55
Repurchase agreements often require sellers to post additional collateral or make
interim payments if the value of the securities or mortgage loans transferred
under the repurchase agreement declines56 and to pay the amount of the
repurchase price at the required repurchase date.57 The ability of a bankruptcy
trustee for a seller that became a debtor in bankruptcy to undo the settlement of
securities or mortgage loan transactions long after they had settled would disrupt
the operation of the securities or mortgage loan markets.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: CUSTODIAN VERSUS FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
The Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978, included a defined term “custodian”
with a very limited and misleading definition and added several provisions
relating to a “custodian.” It also contained special provisions for the liquidation
of stockbrokers and commodity brokers.58 It did not, however, include any safe
harbors for securities contracts or other qualified financial contracts, except for
an exemption from the automatic stay for set off of mutual debts and claims in
connection with commodity contracts and other specialized contracts, including
options to purchase securities, and an exception from the trustee’s avoidance
powers for margin payments on commodity contracts or settlement payments by
a clearing organization.59 In 1982, Congress added the current robust safe

commodity contract, . . . or forward contract, that is made before the commencement of the case,
except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title.
Id.
55
Id. § 546(f) (repo participants in the case of Code repurchase agreements); id. § 546(g) (swap
participants in the case of swap agreements); id. § 546(j) (same limitation for master netting agreement).
56
See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKT. ASS’N, Master Repurchase Agreement 4, ¶ 4 (Sept. 1, 1996), https://www.
sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MRA_Agreement.pdf (describing margin payments due).
57
See id. at 3, ¶ 2(r) (definition of repurchase price); id. at 3, ¶ 3(b) (confirmation of repurchase price for
each transaction); id. at 7, ¶ 11(b) (payment of repurchase price upon event of default by seller).
58
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 741-752, 92 Stat. 2549, 2611–15
(stockbroker liquidation) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 741-751 (1976 Supp. 2)); see id. §§ 761-766, 92 Stat. 2549,
2615-21 (commodity broker liquidation) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 761-766 (1976 Supp. 2)); id. §§ 101(5) and
(39), 92 Stat. 2549, at 2550, 2551 (adding the definitions of stockbroker and commodity broker) (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(5) and (39) (1976 Supp. 2)); id. § 109(d), 92 Stat. 2549, at 2557 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(d)
(1976 Supp. 2) (providing that a stockbroker and a commodity broker may not be a debtor under a chapter 11
reorganization).
59
Id. § 362(b)(6), 92 Stat. 2549, 2570–72 (exempting from the automatic stay “the setoff of any mutual
debt and claim that are commodity futures contracts, forward commodity contracts, leverage transactions,
options, warrants, rights to purchase or sell commodity futures contracts or securities, or options to purchase or
sell commodities or securities”) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) (1976 Supp. 2)); id. § 764(c), 92 Stat. 2549,
2619 (providing that the trustee may not avoid a prepetition constructively fraudulent or preferential transfer
“that is a margin payment to or deposit with a commodity broker or forward contract merchant or is a settlement
payment made by a clearing organization”) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 764(c) (1976 Supp. 2)).
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harbors for stockbrokers under securities contracts and commodity contracts,
and in 1984, Congress extended the robust safe harbors for securities contracts
to the newly defined financial institutions, including customers of financial
institutions acting as an agent or “custodian” for the customer in connection with
securities contracts. In 2005, Congress expanded the safe harbors for repurchase
agreements—both securities contracts and Code repurchase agreements—to
include repurchase agreements for the sale and repurchase of mortgage loans
and interests in mortgage loans.60
A. The Definition of Custodian
Like the original Section 101(10) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Section
101(11) of the current Bankruptcy Code states:
The term “custodian” means—
(A) receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor,
appointed in a case or proceeding not under this title;
(B) assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the
debtor’s creditors; or
(C) trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or under a
contract, that is appointed or authorized to take charge of property of
the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property, or
for the purpose of general administration of such property for the
benefit of the debtor’s creditors[.]61

The 1978 Senate and House Reports on the Bankruptcy Reform Act, which
enacted the Bankruptcy Code, describe a “custodian” as a “prepetition
liquidator” of the debtor’s assets for purposes of facilitating the drafting of the
Bankruptcy Code:
Paragraph (10) defines “custodian.” There is no similar definition in
current law. It is defined to facilitate drafting, and means prepetition
liquidator of the debtor’s property, such as an assignee for the benefit
of creditors, a receiver of the debtor’s property, or a liquidator or
administrator of the debtor’s property. The definition of custodian to
include a receiver or trustee is descriptive, and not meant to be limited
to court officers with those titles. The definition “is intended to include

60

See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101(10), 92 Stat. 2549, 2551 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 101(10) (1976 Supp. 2)). In 1990, subsection (10) was renumbered to subsection (11). Crime Control
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2522(e)(3), 104 Stat. 4789, 4865 (1990) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)
(1986 Supp. 4 and 2018)).
61
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other officers of the court if their functions are substantially similar to
those of a receiver or trustee.”62

The term “custodian” appears in ten different sections of the current
Bankruptcy Code (aside from its appearance in the definition of “financial
institution”). The use of the term custodian as a prepetition liquidator shows that
the primary purpose of defining a custodian-liquidator was to address assets of
a person that had become subject to the prepetition control of a custodianliquidator if the person later became a debtor in bankruptcy. The custodianliquidator would have been appointed to liquidate some or all of the prepetition
assets of such person outside of the federal bankruptcy regime for the benefit of
that person’s creditors. If that person becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, in many
instances the custodian-liquidators is obligated to turn any remaining assets held
for liquidation over to the bankruptcy trustee for inclusion in the debtor’s
bankruptcy estate.63 Other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relate to the
custodian-liquidator’s prepetition administration of the debtor’s former assets64
or the appointment of a custodian-liquidator as an indicator of the prepetition
financial condition of the debtor or as an ipso facto event.65
The term “custodian” is a poor term for the substance of the definition. The
common understanding of a custodian then and now is a person that has custody
of assets for any number of reasons. Therefore, a reader would not expect the
term to refer to a person whose only purpose is to liquidate another person’s
assets for the benefit of the person’s creditors and whose custody merely
supports its role as liquidator. The term simply fails to provide a good sense of

62
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 23 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5809; H.R. REP. NO. 95595, at 310 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6267.
63
11 U.S.C. § 543, quoted infra note 143.
64
See 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1) (dismissal of bankruptcy “reinstates . . . any proceeding or custodianship
superseded under section 543”); id. § 503(b)(3)(E) (expenses of custodian allowable as administrative expense);
id. § 542(a)(1) (turnover of property of the estate does not apply to custodian); id. § 545(1)(C) bankruptcy
trustee’s power to avoid fixing statutory liens on a debtor’s property, provided that such a lien takes effect against
the debtor “when a custodian is appointed or authorized to take or takes possession”); id. § 726(b) (priority of
certain administrative expenses over expenses of custodian in distribution of property of the estate in a chapter
7 liquidation).
65
See id. § 303(h)(2) (appointment of custodian to take charge of substantially all of the property of the
debtor within 120 days of filing of involuntary bankruptcy petition as grounds for entering order of relief); id.
§ 363(l) (invalidity of provisions permitting termination or limitation of trustee’s rights to use property of the
estate because of appointment of custodian); id. § 365(b)(2) (bankruptcy trustee not obligated to cure violation
of provisions permitting termination or limitation of trustee’s rights because of appointment of custodian to
assume executory contract); id. § 365(e) (invalidity of provisions permitting termination or limitation of trustee’s
rights under executory contract because of appointment of custodian); id. § 541(c)(1) (invalidity of provisions
preventing interests of the debtor in property becoming property of the estate because of appointment of
custodian).
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the actual definition of a prepetition liquidator. A better term would have been
the term that was used in the legislative history—prepetition liquidator.66
The Bankruptcy Code’s use of this misleading defined term violates a
fundamental principal of drafting: a defined term should convey a sense of the
meaning of the definition.67 The use of misleading defined terms and their
definitions—commonly referred to as “Humpty-Dumpty” definitions68–
invariably leads both to poor drafting of statutes, regulations and documents and
to subsequent failures to apply the defined terms in statutes, regulations and
documents in the way intended.69 Indeed, the use of the term “custodian” in the
definition of financial institution illustrates the reasons for avoiding Humpty66
See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 23 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5809; H.R. REP. NO.
95-595, at 310 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6267 (quoted supra in text accompanying note
62).
67
See F. REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 17–18, 140–43 (2d. ed., Little,
Brown & Co. 1986) (describing in detail the problems caused by using misleading definitions in which the
defined term fails to give an indication of the substance of the definition). Others who specialize in legal drafting
also provide the same advice. See PETER BUTT AND RICHARD CASTLE, MODERN LEGAL DRAFTING: A GUIDE TO
USING CLEARER LANGUAGE 155–56 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (advising against the use of a
“stretched definition,” or, “definitions that give a word a meaning beyond what a reader would expect”); GEORGE
W. KUNEY AND DONNA C. LOOPER, LEGAL DRAFTING IN A NUTSHELL 384–86 (5th 2021) (advising not to “define
a term in a way that is totally at odds with its commonly accepted or dictionary meaning”); ROBERT J.
MARTINEAU AND ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, JR., DRAFTING LEGISLATION AND RULES IN PLAIN ENGLISH 121
(2013) (advice to eschew a definition that includes things most people would not think that would be included,
such as defining a boat to include an automobile or apple to include an orange); Office of the Parliamentary
Counsel, Drafting Guidance, §§ 4.1.4, 4.1.5, at 31 (June 2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/892409/OPC_drafting_guidance_June_2020-1.pdf
(advising to “[a]void labels that are misleading,” instead to try to use “a label that gives the reader some clue as
to what it means” but to be careful because a poorly chosen label might affect the meaning in unwanted ways);
General Assembly Of Maryland Dep’t Of Legislative Reference, Maryland Style Manual For Statutory Law 31
(2018) (stating “Avoid ‘Humpty Dumpty’ Definitions: Do not define a term to have a meaning that is contrary
to what the term normally is understood to mean.”).
68
See generally BUTT AND CASTLE, supra note 67, at 155–56 (noting that the term “HumptyDumptyisms” derived from Lewis Carroll’s character’s statement, “When I use a word, it means just what I
choose it to mean— neither more nor less”) (citing LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND
AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 127 (Wellington Publishing 1989)); see DICKERSON, supra note 67, at 17–
18, 141–43 (also referencing Humpty Dumpty’s statement ); see also KUNEY AND LOOPER, supra note 67, at
384–85 (noting the Lewis Carroll source for the reference to such definitions as “Humpty-Dumpty Definitions”).
69
See DICKERSON, supra note 67, at 17–18, 141–44 (discussing extensive problems); see also KUNEY
AND LOOPER, supra note 67, at 384–86 (describing some of the pitfalls arising from using such definitions,
including the ambiguity arising from the defined term in its conventional sense and forgetting its actual
counterintuitive meaning); Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and Chattel
Paper Under the U.C.C. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 CONN. L. REV. 397,
406–12 (1994) (describing the internal drafting errors and the subsequent misapplication of Article 9 resulting
from the use of misleading defined terms for the sale of accounts and chattel paper under the original Uniform
Commercial Code Article 9); Thomas E. Plank, Assignment of Receivables Under Article 9: Structural
Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 240–47 (2007) (same under 2001 revision of UCC
Article 9).
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Dumpty definitions. Given the enormity of the revision of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 as amended,70 this error is understandable. Nevertheless, as discussed
below, it naturally led to problems when the drafters of later amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code used the term custodian in its ordinary sense.
B. The Addition of the Safe Harbors for Financial Institutions
Repurchase agreements for securities, which were first used by Federal
Reserve Banks in 1917, became economically more important in the securities
market beginning in the 1950s, and the volume of repurchase agreements
expanded dramatically in the 1970s as a result of rising interest rates and
increasing issuance of United States securities.71 Repurchase agreements helped
the Federal Reserve Board implement monetary policy, financed the market
making and risk management activities of securities dealers, and allowed banks,
mutual funds, non-financial corporations, state and local governments, and
governmental agencies to earn money by providing funds to securities dealers
and other financial institutions.72
Although repurchase agreements have been recognized as financing
arrangements, they have been structured as two transactions: a sale of securities
and an obligation to repurchase securities. Also, repurchase agreements
provided that the buyer could sell the securities immediately if the seller failed
to repurchase the securities, the seller otherwise defaulted, or the seller became
a debtor in bankruptcy. Before enactment of the safe harbors for repurchase
agreements, there was considerable ambiguity about the rights of a buyer under
a repurchase agreement if the seller were to become a debtor in bankruptcy.73

70
See generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
(Princeton Univ. Press 2001) (examining the political history of development of American bankruptcy law in
the twentieth century, including the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978).
71
See Kenneth D. Garbade, The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 1980s, 12 FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 27, 29–31 (2006); see Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents:
The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1640 (2008).
72
See Garbade, supra note 71, at 29–31; see also S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 45 (1983) reprinted in 1 BERNARD
D. REAMS, JR. & EUGENE M. WYPSKI, BANKRUPTCY REFORM AMENDMENTS: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS AND FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1984, PUBLIC LAW 98-353, doc. 15, at 45 (1992):

The repo market serves a crucial function for both parties to the repo transaction. The country’s
major institutional and fiduciary investors make heavy use of repos. For these investors, including
such entities as state and local governments, public and private pension funds, money market and
other mutual funds, banks, thrift institutions, and large corporations, repos have become a vital
tool of cash management.
73

See Garbade, supra note 71, at 34–35; see also Kenneth C. Kettering, supra note 71, at 1642–43.
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1. The 1982 Legislation: Safe Harbor for Stockbrokers under Securities
Contracts
In light of the structure and the volatility of the securities and commodities
markets in the early 1980s, Federal officials involved in the securities market
presented to Congress their concerns about the adverse effects on stockbrokers
if their counterparties under repurchase agreements became debtors in
bankruptcy. There was a similar concern about commodity brokers under
commodity contracts. The specific concerns were (i) the ability of a bankruptcy
trustee of the counterparty to avoid margin payments (payments to be made by
the seller if the value of the securities sold under a repurchase agreement
declined in value before the repurchase date) or settlement payments (payments
to repurchase securities) and (ii) the effect of the automatic stay preventing
stockbrokers from closing out the open accounts of insolvent customers or
brokers.74
As a result, in 1982, Congress added the following safe harbor provisions to
the Bankruptcy Code: a new defined term, “securities contract,”75 a new Section
555 to permit stockbrokers or securities clearing agencies to liquidate, terminate
or accelerate a securities contract if the counterparty became a debtor in
bankruptcy,76 and other safe harbor provisions for stockbrokers and securities

74
H.R REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583. The purpose of the bill is
described as follows:

The commodities and securities markets operate through a complex system of accounts and
guarantees. Because of the structure of the clearing systems in these industries and the sometimes
volatile nature the markets, certain protections are necessary to prevent the insolvency of one
commodity or security firm from spreading to other firms and possible threatening the collapse
of the affected market.
H.R REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583. The House Report also stated that a
subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary received testimony from the Chairman of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, general
counsel of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, and representatives of numerous commodities and
securities brokers and clearing organizations at hearings on how the Bankruptcy Code affected the commodities
and securities trading industries. As a result of those hearings, the bill that became Public Law 97-222 was
introduced on November 10, 1981. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 584.
75
11 U.S.C. § 741(7) (1982); see also Act of July 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-222, § 8(5), 96 Stat. 235, 237
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 741 (1982)) (adding a new paragraph (7) defining a “securities contract” to
mean a “contract for the purchase, sale, or loan of a security, including an option for the purchase or sale of a
security, or the guarantee of any settlement of cash or securities by or to a securities clearing agency.”). The
definition was amended in 1984 to add the then new defined “financial institution.” In 2005, the definition of
securities contract was completely rewritten and broadened, but its essence was not changed. See generally
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907(a)(2), 119 Stat.
23, 173–74 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)) (quoted supra note 2).
76
11 U.S.C. § 555 (1982); see also Act of July 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-222, § 6(a), 96 Stat. 235, 236
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clearing agencies under a securities contract.77 The House Report for this
legislation stated “[t]he prompt closing out or liquidation of such open accounts
freezes the status quo and minimizes the potentially massive losses and chain
reactions that could occur if the market were to move sharply in the wrong
direction.”78

2. The 1984 Legislation: Safe Harbors for Repurchase Agreements and
for Financial Institutions under Securities Contracts
The August 12, 1982, bankruptcy filing by Lombard-Wall, Inc., a
government securities dealer,79 revealed the limitations of the 1982 revisions to
the Bankruptcy Code. Lombard-Wall had sold securities pursuant to repurchase
agreements to various entities, including banks, non-financial corporations, and
state and local governments and governmental agencies. On August 17, 1982,
the bankruptcy court announced that it would treat the transfer of securities by
Lombard-Wall to its counterparties under repurchase agreements as a grant of a
security interest to secure a loan instead of a sale of the securities and issued a
temporary restraining order prohibiting liquidation or sale of the securities
pursuant to the standard liquidation provisions of the repurchase agreements.80

(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 555). The original Section 555 as enacted by Section 6(a) of Pub. L. No.
97-222 states:
The exercise of a contractual right of a stockbroker or securities clearing agency to cause the
liquidation of a securities contract, as defined in section 741(7), because of a condition of the
kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of this title shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited
by operation of any provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any
proceeding under this title unless such order is authorized under the provisions of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.) or any statute administered by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. As used in this section, the term ‘contractual right’
includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw of a national securities exchange, a national securities
association, or a securities clearing agency.
Id. § 6(a), 96 Stat. 235, 236 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 555 (1982)). The act added a comparable provision, Section
556, for liquidation, termination or acceleration of commodity contracts. See id. § 6(b).
77
See id. § 3(c) (amending Section 362(b)(6) to expand the exemption from the automatic stay for setoffs
by stockbrokers or securities clearing agencies under a securities contract); see also id. § 4 (adding a new
subsection (d) to Section 546 to prevent a bankruptcy trustee from avoiding margin payments or settlement
payments to stockbrokers or securities clearing agencies under a securities contract and moving the provisions
of Section 764(c)(4) for commodity contracts enacted in 1978 to this subsection).
78
H.R REP. NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 584.
79
In re Lombard-Wall Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1982).
80
See Docket, In re Lombard-Wall Inc., No. 82-B-11556 (copy on file with author and the Journal)
(“Order signed (8/17) Re: that any Creditor Holding Securities of D-I-P, Pursuant to a Repurchase Agreement
or Investment Agreement with D-I-P shall not Dispose of such Collateral, as Such Disposal Constitutes a
Violation of the Automatic Stay”); Lombard Securities With Buy-Back Plan Are Frozen by Court, WALL ST. J.,
August 18, 1982, at 7; Garbade, supra note 71, at 35.
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One month later, the court issued a bench ruling in an adversary proceeding,
Lombard-Wall Inc. v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co. (In re Lombard-Wall Inc.),81
consistent with its August 17 determination, and held that the automatic stay of
the Bankruptcy Code prevented the buyer of securities, the Dauphin Deposit
Bank and Trust Company, acting as trustee for an issue of Dauphin County
Hospital Authority revenue bonds, from liquidating the securities without the
approval of the bankruptcy court.82
The 1982 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code protected stockbrokers from
the bankruptcy risks of its counterparties. These amendments, however, did not
protect the counterparties if a stockbroker became a debtor in bankruptcy. The
rulings in Lombard-Wall were the first to limit the buyer’s ability to liquidate
the securities subject to a repurchase agreement immediately upon the seller’s
default or bankruptcy.83 This ruling had a significant adverse effect on the repo
market and the ability of banks, non-financial corporations, mutual funds, and
state and local governmental agencies to provide funds to securities brokers.84
Partly in response to the Lombard-Wall Inc. bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve
Board proposed that Congress enact legislation that would provide a safe harbor
to any party to a repurchase agreement for United States treasury securities and
specific types of other securities.85 As a result, in early 1983 Senator Robert Dole
81

Docket, In re Lombard-Wall Inc., supra note 80.
See In re Lombard-Wall Inc., supra note 79; see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 47 (1983), reprinted in 1
REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. 15, at 47 (describing the case). See generally S. Hrg. 98-118, Bankruptcy
Reform: Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. Decision; Consumer Credit Code Amendments;
Agricultural Produce Bailment Amendments; Repurchase Agreement Code Amendments; Shopping Center
Tenancy Amendments; And Timesharing Agreements Amendments, Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the Cts. of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 332–33 (1983), reprinted in 8 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc.
94, at 332–33 (statement Regarding Proposed Repo Amendments of the Bankruptcy Code, attached to statement
of Peter D. Sternlight, Executive Vice President Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Manager For Domestic
Operations System Open Market Account) [hereinafter, S. Hrg. 98-118]; see also Garbade, supra note 71, at 35;
Tim Carrington, Securities in Lombard-Wall Case Termed Loan Collateral by a Bankruptcy Judge, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 20, 1982, at 10, col. 2.
83
See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Repo Madness: The Characterization of Repurchase Agreements Under the
Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C., 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1008–11 (1996) (discussing the disastrous effects
of the Lombard-Wall Inc. decision on the repurchase agreement market and on the Federal Reserve and the
financial community); William F. Hagerty, Note, Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty Over the Repo Market:
Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases and Sales of Securities, 37 VAND. L. REV. 401, 409–10 (1984)
(stating that Lombard-Wall Inc. was the first case to hold that a repurchase agreement was a grant of a security
interest to secure a debt).
84
See Garbade, supra note 71, at 34–35; Kettering, supra note 71, at 1641; see also supra notes 74 & 78
and accompanying text (describing committee reports and testimony of witnesses at congressional hearings on
the purpose of the safe harbor amendments).
85
See Schroeder, supra note 83, at 1010–11. See generally S. Hrg. 98-118 at 318-327, supra note 82,
reprinted in 8 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. no 94 at 318–27 (statement of Peter D. Sternlight,
Executive Vice President Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Manager, Domestic Operations System Open
82
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introduced Senate Bill 445 which, in part, provided a safe harbor for a specific
kind of repurchase agreement that was defined, confusingly enough, as a
“repurchase agreement.”86 Senate Bill 445 also included provisions that
broadened the safe harbor provisions for securities contracts by extending those
safe harbors to a newly defined “financial institution.”87
Senate Bill 445 was not enacted, but Congress included its provisions almost
verbatim in the Senate and House Bills that resulted in the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.88 Title III, Subtitle F, of this
Act, the “Amendments Regarding Repurchase Agreements,” enacted the safe
harbors provisions for the newly defined “repurchase agreements”—what I have
referred to as the Code repurchase agreements.89 Specific provisions of Title III,
Market Account); Garbade, supra note 71, at 36; Letter from Paul Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, to Robert Dole, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts of the United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 29, 1982), in REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND REVERSE REPURCHASE
AGREEMENTS at 397–98 (Alan S. Dunning and Martin E. Lowy, cochairmen, Commercial Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series no. 290, Practicing Law Institute 1982) [hereinafter, PLI REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS].
86
Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, S. 445, 98th Cong. § 281 (1983). in 4 REAMS &
WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. No. 74 at 39–43.
87
Id. § 311(j) (definition of financial institution); id. 336(b)(3)(B) (exemption from automatic stay); id.
358(d) (limit on trustee avoidance power); id. § 366(a) (qualified counterparty for liquidation, termination and
acceleration of securities contract) (1983) reprinted in 4 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. No. 74 at 49-50,
59, 88, 96.
88
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984)
(codified in various sections of 11 U.S.C. (1982 Supp. 2)).
89
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(35), (36) (1982 Supp. 2) (adding two new definitions: (1) “repo participant” as
a party that has the benefit of the safe harbors under a Code repurchase agreement, and (2) “repurchase
agreement”); id. § 362(b)(7) (exempting setoff of margin payments and settlement payments under a Code
repurchase agreement from the automatic stay); id. § 546(f) (exempting transfers of margin payments and
settlement payments under a Code repurchase agreement from the trustee’s power to avoid constructively
fraudulent or preferential transfers); id. § 559 (permitting the immediate liquidation, termination or acceleration
of a Code repurchase agreement by a repo participant), as added by Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 392-393, 396, 98
Stat. at 362-66 (1984). Section 101(36) defined “repurchase agreement” to mean:
any agreement, including related terms, which provides for the transfer of certificates of deposit,
eligible bankers’ acceptances, or securities that are direct obligations of, or that are fully
guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or any agency of the United States
against the transfer of funds by the transferee of such [instruments] with a simultaneous
agreement by such transferee to transfer to the transferor thereof [such instruments] as described
above, at a date certain within two years after such transfers or on demand, against the transfer
of funds.
Id. § 101(36). This definition was substantially the same as that in S. 445 Code except for reduction of the date
certain for transfer back to the transfer from two years to one year. Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of
1983, S. 445, 98th Cong. § 281 (1983), reprinted in 4 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. No. 74 at 39. This
definition is also substantially the same as that in the current Code except for the later addition of mortgage
related securities, mortgage loans, interests in mortgage related securities or mortgage loans, and certain
qualified foreign government securities. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)(a)(i). The 1984 Act also broadened the
definition of repo participant that had been in S. 445. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1982 Supp. 2).
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Subtitle I, Technical Amendments of the Act, extended to the newly defined
“financial institution” the safe harbors for repurchase agreements that were
securities contracts.90 The new definition of “financial institution” included the
term “custodian”:
“[F]inancial institution” means a person that is a commercial or
savings bank, industrial savings bank, savings and loan association, or
trust company and, when any such person is acting as agent or
custodian for a customer in connection with a securities contract, as
defined in section 741(7) of this title, such customer[.]91

The only significant difference between the 1984 legislation and the 1983
Senate Bill 443 was in the definition of “repurchase agreement”: the maximum
time for a repurchase on a fixed date was shortened from two years in Senate
Bill 443 to one year in the 1984 legislation.92
3. The Role of a Custodian for Non-Financial Participants
The legislative history for these amendments extending the safe harbors to
the parties to Code repurchase agreements and adding financial institutions to
the then existing safe harbors for securities contracts demonstrates that the term
“custodian” in the definition of “financial institution” was intended to mean not
the “prepetition liquidator” embodied in the definition of “custodian” under then
Section 101(10) and now Section 101(11), but a financial institution holding
securities as a custodian (in the ordinary sense) for a customer.93
A primary movant for the addition of the safe harbors for Code repurchase
agreements, that is, repurchase agreements for United States securities and
certain other securities to be repurchased within one year or on demand, was the
Federal Reserve Board. As the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board stated,
the then proposed safe harbors for Code repurchase agreements “has the same
90
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(19) (1982 Supp. 2) (adding a new definition of “financial institution”), id.
§ 362(b)(6) (adding an exemption from the automatic stay for setoff of margin payments and settlement
payments in favor of a financial institution under a securities contract), id. § 546(e) (adding the exemption from
trustee’s power to avoid constructively fraudulent or preferential transfers of margin payments and settlement
payments in favor of a financial institution under a securities contract), id. § 555 (permitting the immediate
liquidation, termination or acceleration of a securities contract by a financial institution), as added by Pub. L.
No. 98-353, §§ 421(j)(4), 441(b)(2), 461(d), 469, 98 Stat. at 368, 371, 377, 380 (1984).
91
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 421, 98 Stat. 333
(1982 Supp. 2) (codified 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(19) (1982 Supp. 2)) (emphasis added) (providing the same definition
as that set forth in in S. 445, with the exception of the addition of “a” before “person”).
92
Compare id. § 391, with Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, S. 445, 98th Cong. § 281
(1983), reprinted in 4 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. No. 74 at 39.
93
See supra note 18 (citing the definition of custodian in the 1979 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary).
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objective [as the safe harbors for the then existing securities contracts, which did
not extend to financial institutions] but would take a somewhat different
approach. Instead of protecting certain classes of market participants, it would
exempt a particular class of transactions—the repo.”94
The Federal Reserve Board was not a public advocate before Congress for
extending the safe harbor for securities contracts to financial institutions,
including non-financial customers of a financial institution that acted as agent or
custodian. In addition, the committee reports and testimony of witnesses did not
include any specific discussion of the extension of the safe harbors for securities
contracts to financial institutions or to non-financial institutions for whom a
financial institution acted as agent or custodian.95 Nevertheless, this extension
was consistent with the repurchase agreement amendments, the legislative
reports and the testimony. Indeed, the congressional reports described the
addition of financial institutions (including non-financial customers for which
financial institutions acted as agents or custodians) to the safe harbor of Section
555 as a “conforming amendment.”96
Industry groups as well as the Federal Reserve Board supported the 1983
Senate Bill 445 and the 1984 Senate Bill 5174 that enacted the safe harbors for
repurchase agreements and extended the safe harbors to financial institutions
under securities contracts.97 The Senate Report98 and testimony before
Congress99 also described the non-financial entities as well as the financial
94
See Letter from Paul Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Sept. 29, 1982),
supra note 85, in PLI REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS at 398.
95
See generally S. REP. NO. 98-65 (1983), reprinted in 1 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. 15;
Bankruptcy Law and Repurchase Agreements: Hearings on H.R. 2852 and H.R. 3418 Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 72 (May 2, 1984); S. Hrg. 98118, supra note 82, at 332–33, reprinted in 8 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. no 94 at 332-33; Hearing
on S. 333, A Bill to Amend Title 11 of the United States Code To Make Certain Changes in the Personal
Bankruptcy Law, and for Other Purposes and S. 445, a Bill to Amend Title 11 of the United States Code, and
for Other Purposes, before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 322 (Apr. 6, 1983), reprinted in 9 REAMS
& WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. No. 96 [hereinafter, S. Hrg. 98-574].
96
S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 82, reprinted in 1 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. 15, at 82 (sectional
analysis of the Technical and Clarifying Amendments for Section 366(a) of the Senate Bill). The Senate Report
also described the addition by Section 358(d) of the Senate Bill of financial institution as a protected party in the
limitation on the trustee avoidance powers as a “conforming amendment” but described the addition in Section
336(b)(3) of the Senate bill of financial institution to the exemption from the automatic stay as “stylistic
changes.” S. REP. NO. 98-65 at 76, 81, reprinted in 1 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. 15, at 76, 81.
97
See generally notes 98–99 infra and accompany text.
98
See S. REP. NO. 98-65 at 45 , reprinted in 1 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. 15, at 45 (referring
to “heavy use” of repurchase agreements by major institutional and fiduciary investors including state and local
governments, public and private pension funds, money market and other mutual funds, banks, thrift institutions,
and large corporations).
99
See S. Hrg. 98-118 at 340, supra note 82, reprinted in 8 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. 94, at
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institutions that used market repurchase agreements and that were adversely
affected by the Lombard-Wall ruling. The legislative reports and the testimony
of witnesses show that the role of custodians in market repurchase agreements
on behalf of both financial and non-financial parties to repurchase agreements
was commonplace.
For example, the Senate Report and testimony from an official of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York specifically noted that the repo participants entitled
to the safe harbors under Code repurchase agreement would include financial
institutions acting on their own behalf or on behalf of customers. Specifically,
the Senate Report for Senate Bill 445 stated that the new definition of repo
participant is intended to include “an entity acting for its own account or for the
account of one or more other entities (whether as custodian, trustee, fiduciary,
agent or in any other capacity).”100
These statements reflect the market practice for all repurchase agreements,
not just Code repurchase agreements. It was understood that not all repurchase
agreements would meet the definition of a Code repurchase agreement.101 If a
repurchase agreement required repurchase of the securities more than one year
after the sale date, without any provision for repurchase on demand of the seller
or the buyer, or if the securities sold under the repurchase agreement were not

340 (statement of Thomas W. Strauss, Chairman, Government and Federal Agency Securities Division, on
behalf of the Public Securities Association) (describing the investment of funds in repurchase agreements by
institutional investors, including mutual funds, pension funds, state and local governments, commercial banks,
thrifts, corporations and other securities dealers for their own account or on behalf of others); id. at 333
(statement of Peter D. Sternlight, Executive Vice President Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Manager,
Domestic Operations System Open Market Account) (describing uncertainty regarding the ability of certain
investors to exercise remedies under repurchase agreements causing special problems for certain categories of
investors, such as public housing authorities, Indian housing authorities, FHA-approved mortgagees for
multifamily projects and municipal governments).
100
S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 69, reprinted in 1 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. 15, at 69 (sectional
analysis of the Repurchase Agreement). This sentence in the report is identical to the proposed section by section
analysis of the definition submitted by Peter D. Sternlight, Executive Vice President Federal Reserve Bank of
New York and Manager for Domestic Operations System Open Market Account at the hearings before the Senate
Committee of the Judiciary on Senate Bill 445. See S. Hrg. 98-118, supra note 82, at 321–22, reprinted in 8
REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. no 94 at 321-22 (statement of Peter D. Sternlight, Executive Vice
President Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Manager, Domestic Operations System Open Market
Account).
101
The reference to a “repo” in Paul Volcker’s September 29, 1982, letter to Senator Dole requesting
congressional action to provide a safe harbor for repurchase agreements is ambiguous. In the first part of his
letter, he describes the repo as a contract for the sale and repurchase of “various kinds of securities, including
U.S. government and agency securities, banker’s acceptances, and CDs.” Letter from Paul Volcker, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 29, 1982), supra note 85, in PLI REPURCHASE
AGREEMENTS at 397. The proposed legislation, however, addressed only repos of U.S. government and agency
securities, banker’s acceptances, and CDs. Letter from Paul Volcker, supra, at 398.
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United State Treasury securities or the other securities specified in the definition
of a Code repurchase agreement, the repurchase agreement would still be a
securities contract.102 Extending the safe harbors for securities contracts to
financial institutions and to non-financial institution customers for whom
financial institutions were acting as agent or custodian is consistent with the
purpose of creating the safe harbor for Code repurchase agreements and with the
legislative history noted above that such an extension was a conforming
amendment.
One example of the use by state and local governments and governmental
agencies of repurchase agreements in the early 1980s as a means of investing
available cash were tax exempt bonds issued by the Community Development
Administration of Maryland (the “CDA”) to finance multi-family and single
family housing for low and moderate income families.103 The bonds were
secured primarily by mortgage loans to developers of multi-family housing or
by single family mortgage loans to first time home buyers. Pending distribution
of the initial proceeds from the sale of the bonds and of collections on the
mortgage loans securing the bonds, the bonds were also secured by the deposit
of those proceeds and collections into a variety of reserve funds held by the
indenture trustee for the bonds. Before and after the commencement of the
Lombard-Wall Inc. bankruptcy case on August 12, 1982, the CDA issued three
series of multi-family bonds in 1982 and three series of single family bonds in
1980 and 1982104
Under the governing documents for the multi-family bonds, the indenture
trustee was directed to invest funds credited to the reserve funds in “Permitted
Investments.” Permitted Investments included repurchase agreements for the

102
See text accompanying notes 2–8 supra, contrasting the difference between a repurchase agreement
that is a securities contract, which has no limits on the specific types of securities or times for repurchase, and a
repurchase agreement that qualifies as a Code repurchase agreement, which is limited to specific categories of
securities and to a repurchase within one year or on demand.
103
See MD. CODE ANN., Art. 41, § 266DD-6 (1981) (current version at MD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. CODE
§§ 245-52 (2021)). I was an assistant attorney general of Maryland and the Counsel to the Maryland Department
of Economic and Community Development, of which the CDA was a division, from July 1982 through
December 1984, and I issued legal opinions on behalf of the Maryland Attorney General on the legality of the
issuance of CDA bonds under the CDA authorizing legislation.
104
The CDA issued $32,335,000 Multi-Family Housing Revenue Bonds 1982 Series A on May 1, 1982,
$16,510,000 1982 Series B Bonds on July 15, 1982, and $66,741,5000 1982 Series C Bonds on September 14,
1982, and $100,000,000 Single Family Program Bonds 1980 Series A on April 1, 1980, $42,200,000 1980 Series
B Bonds on July 1, 1980, and $87,513,7000 1982 First Series Bonds on October 1, 1982. See Official Statement,
Community Development Administration Multi-Family Housing Revenue Bonds (Insured Mortgage Loans),
1983 Series A, at 16 (Jan. 1, 1983) (copy on file with author and the Journal) [hereinafter Multi-Family Official
Statement].
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sale and repurchase of securities held by a “fiduciary” that would not have been
qualifying securities for a Code repurchase agreement under the original 1984
Bankruptcy Code definition and the current definition of a Code repurchase
agreement. Nevertheless, these securities would be qualifying securities for a
securities contract under the original 1982 Bankruptcy Code definition and the
current definition.105
The governing documents for the single-family program bonds provided for
the investment of funds in “Investment Obligations” similar to those for the
multi-family bonds. However, under the single-family program, the indenture
trustee could invest only in repurchase agreements for the sale and repurchase
of obligations of or guaranteed by the United States and obligations of a variety
of U.S. governmental entities.106 These repurchase agreements would have
qualified as Code repurchase agreements under the original and current
definition in the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to this authority under both
indentures, the CDA used repurchase agreements for the investment of tens of
millions of dollars of funds to be credited to the reserve funds for both the multifamily bonds and the single-family bonds.107
As discussed above, the commencement of the Lombard-Wall Inc.
bankruptcy case prevented the counterparties’ immediate liquidation and
105
These bonds were issued pursuant to a Resolution Providing for the Issuance of Multi-Family Housing
Revenue Bond Program adopted by the CDA on May 1, 1982 (copy on file with the author and the Journal)
[hereinafter, Multi-Family Resolution]. Under the Multi-Family Resolution “Permitted Investments” consisted
of: (1) obligations of or guaranteed by the United States; (2) obligations of a variety of U.S. governmental
entities; (3) public housing bonds of public agencies or municipalities secured by contracts with the United States
government; (4) certificates of deposits issued by banks that met certain credit criteria; (5) notes issued by a
bank-holding company having a rating of AAA or AA from the two leading rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s
and Moody’s Investors Service; and (6) “contracts for the purchase and sale of obligations described” in the
preceding clauses 1–6 that, with certain exceptions, are delivered to and held by a fiduciary during the term of
the contracts. Multi-Family Resolution, supra, at 8–9; Multi-Family Official Statement, supra note 104, at 18.
The obligations described in clauses (3) and (5) would not be eligible securities for a Code repurchase agreement
under the original 1984 definition or the current definition. See supra note 89 (quoting the original definition of
repurchase agreement and discussing subsequent amendments) and supra note 75 (quoting original definition of
securities contract added in 1982 and subsequent amendments) and supra note 2 (quoting current definition of
securities contract).
106
See Official Statement, Community Development Administration Single Family Program Bonds, 1982
First Series Dated October 1, 1982, at 8–9 (definition of Investment Obligations) (copy on file with the author
and the Journal) [hereinafter, Singly Family Official Statement]; CDA Single Family Program General Bond
Certificate Dated May 1, 1980, at 8–9 (copy on file with the author and the Journal).
107
As of June 30, 1982, the CDA had invested $22,818,547 of the $32,335,000 Multi-Family Bonds 1982
Series A issued in May 1982 in repurchase agreements pending the lending of these funds to multi-family
developers. See Multi-Family Official Statement, supra note 104, at D-3. In addition, the CDA had invested,
respectively, $12,776,429 and $6,722,403, as of June 30, 1981, and 1982, in repurchase agreements securing in
part approximately $148,000,000 single family bonds then outstanding. See Single Family Official Statement,
supra note 106, at C3.
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termination of repurchase agreements with Lombard-Wall. The affected
repurchase agreements included those entered into with the CDA. Fortunately,
the CDA obtained quick relief from the automatic stay to liquidate the
underlying securities sold by Lombard-Wall and held by the indenture trustee
on behalf of the CDA and its bond holders.108 Many other financial institutions,
governmental units, and non-financial business entities that had entered into
repurchase agreements with Lombard-Wall which had taken possession of the
underlying securities directly or through a custodian or trustee also sought and
obtained relief from the automatic stay.109
When Congress was deliberating on the 1983 and 1984 safe harbor
legislation, most securities, other than United States securities, were certificated
securities, that is, securities evidenced by a printed certificate.110 Applicable
state law permitted buyers to perfect their interests in certificated securities sold
pursuant to market repurchase agreements by taking possession, either directly
or through custodians (in the ordinary sense of the term).111 For United States
108
See Docket, In re Lombard-Wall Inc., supra note 80 (referencing Community Development
Administration adv. proc. No 82-60002-A, filed Aug. 18, 1982, closed Aug. 26, 1982).
109
See id. (referencing proceedings seeking or obtaining relief from the automatic stay by numerous nonfinancial businesses, state and local governmental agencies, and banks, trust companies, and savings
associations, including banking institutions and trust companies acting on behalf of governmental agencies).
110
It has always been understood that a certificated security is evidenced by a “certificate,” that is, a
writing, and current Article 8 defines it as such. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(4) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994).
Before 1977, all securities were certificated. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(1) (AM. L. INT. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1962)
(superseded 1977) (defining a security as an “instrument”). The 1977 revision of Article 8 added provisions for
uncertificated securities issued by issuers and evidenced by entry on the books and records of the issuer and a
new defined term of “certificated security. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(1) (AM. L. INT. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977)
(superseded 1994) (defining a “certificated security” as a security evidenced by an instrument). As of 1982, the
1977 revisions to Article 8 had been adopted in New York and a several other states. See Harold S. Novikoff &
Mitchell R. Julius, Repurchase Agreements and Reverse Repurchase Agreements under Articles 8 and 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, in PLI REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS, supra note 85, at 79, 90–96.
Before the adoption of this definition in 1994, the definitions of “security” or “certificated security”
were not helpful. Before 1994, the 1962 Official Text and the 1972 Official Text of Article 9, adopted in 1972
and revised in 1977, defined an instrument as (i) a “negotiable instrument” under Article 3, which is evidenced
by a writing, (ii) either a “security” as defined in the 1962 version and the 1972 version of Article 8 before 1977
or a “certificated security” as defined in the 1977 version of Article 8, or (iii) other writing that met certain
criteria. U.C.C. § 9-105(g) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1962) (superseded 2001); U.C.C. § 9-105(g) (AM.
L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1972) (superseded 2001); U.C.C. § 9-105(i) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N
1977) (superseded 2001). Hence, as to the physical nature of a certificated security, these earlier definitions were
not definitions at all.
111
See U.C.C. § 9-305 (Am. L. Int. & Unif. L. Comm’n 1962) (providing that a security interest in an
instrument, which includes a security, may be perfected by possession and also stating “If such collateral other
than goods covered by a negotiable document is held by a bailee, the secured party is deemed to have possession
from the time the bailee receives notification of the secured party’s interest”) (revised in 1972 to add money and
revised in 1977 to exclude “certificated securities”); U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(a) (Am. L. Int. & Unif. L. Comm’n 1977)
(superseded 1994) (providing that “transfer of a security or a limited interest (including a security interest)
therein to a purchaser occurs only (a) at the time he or a person designated by him acquires possession of a
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securities issued in book entry form, federal regulations first promulgated in
1973 provided for perfection of an interest in such securities by a procedure that
was deemed to be the equivalent of possession of physical securities.112 As
discussed below, the benefit and costs of buyers taking possession to protect
their interests and the risks if they did not do so were known.
In one form of repurchase agreement, the seller delivered the securities to
the buyer or the buyer’s custodian. In this form of transaction, the buyer could
easily liquidate the securities if the seller defaulted. However, because most
securities other than United States securities were certificated securities,
delivery of possession of the securities could be problematic because of the cost
of and the time constraints for delivering physical possession.113
In another form of repurchase agreement, the seller retained possession
directly or through its custodian and notified the buyer that it had segregated the
securities. This arrangement facilitated transactions because there was no deliver
of the physical securities. However, if the seller failed to maintain the securities
as promised, the buyer would have no ability to liquidate the securities if the
certificated security”); U.C.C. § 8-321(2) & (3) (providing that a security interest in a certificated security is
perfected upon transfer as defined in Section 8-313(1)) (Am. L. Int. & Unif. L. Comm’n 1977) (superseded
1994); see also Harold S. Novikoff & Mitchell R. Julius, Repurchase Agreements and Reverse Repurchase
Agreements under Articles 8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in PLI REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS, supra
note 85, at 79, 90–95, 102–07 (discussing the provisions of the 1972 revision of Article 9 and the 1977 revision
of Article 8 then in effect in New York and a few other states—which moved such provisions from Article 9 to
Article 8—for perfection of a secured party’s security interest in certificated securities by possession by bailee
or agent).
112
The book entry regulations for United States securities in effect in 1984 specifically referred to financial
institutions acting as a custodian for customers for purposes of perfecting a security interest in book entry
securities:
Where transferable Treasury securities are recorded on the books of a depositary (a bank, banking
institution, financial firm, or similar party, which regularly accepts in the course of its business
Treasury securities as a custodial service for customers, and maintains accounts in the names
of such customers reflecting ownership of or interest in such securities) for account of the pledgor
or transferor thereof and such securities are on deposit with a Reserve bank in a book-entry
account hereunder, such depositary shall, for purposes of perfecting a pledge of such securities
or effecting delivery of such securities to a purchaser under applicable provisions of law, be the
bailee to which notification of the pledge of the securities may be given or the third person in
possession from which acknowledgment of the holding of the securities for the purchaser may be
obtained.
31 C.F.R. § 306.118(b) (1984) (first promulgated 38 Fed. Reg. 7078 (Mar. 15, 1973)) (emphasis added); see
also Harold S. Novikoff & Mitchell R. Julius, Repurchase Agreements and Reverse Repurchase Agreements
under Articles 8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in PLI REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS, supra note 85, at
79, 113–14 (1985) (discussing the provisions of the federal book-entry regulations for U.S. government
securities permitting pledge of book-entry securities recorded on the books of an entity which performs a
custodial service for customers, citing 31 C.F.R. 306.118 and 31 C.F.R. 350(a)(3) in effect at that time).
113
See generally Garbade, supra note 71, at 37–39.
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seller were to default and would often be left with an unsecured claim against
the seller.114
A third form, the tri-party repurchase agreement developed in the 1970s by
the investment banking firm of Salomon Brothers, struck a happy medium
between the two positions. In a tri-party repurchase agreement among the seller,
the buyer, and a bank acting as agent or custodian for both the seller and buyer
(often the seller’s clearing bank), the seller of the securities delivered securities
to the bank and the buyer delivered funds to the bank. The bank would hold the
securities as custodian for the buyer by crediting the seller’s securities to the
buyer’s account and would credit the buyer’s funds to the seller’s account or pay
them to the seller. Accordingly, the buyer had possession of the purchased
securities through the bank as its custodian. Upon repurchase by the seller, the
seller would deliver the repurchase price to the bank, which would credit the
funds to the buyer’s account or pay them to the buyer. The bank would
simultaneously transfer the purchased securities from the buyer’s account to the
seller’s account or transfer them to the seller. If the seller failed to repurchase
the securities or otherwise defaulted, the bank would, upon instructions from the
buyer, liquidate the securities and pay the amounts due to the buyer out of the
liquidation proceeds.115
The committee reports and the hearings discussed the significance of buyers
under market repurchase agreements taking possession or control of the related
securities either directly or through a custodian. For example, in 1984 Peter D.
Sternlight, executive vice president, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
submitted answers to the questions of the Chairman of the House Committee of
the Judiciary about lax practices in the repurchase agreement market and the

114
See id. at 37–39; see also In re Beville, 67 B.R. 557, 571 (D.N.J. 1986). In In re Beville, two affiliated
securities dealers became subject to insolvency proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code and the Securities
Investor Protection Act, and the trustees for the dealers sought to characterize a large number of repurchase
agreements as secured transactions and claim ownership of the securities sold under the repurchase agreements.
The district court held that the repurchase agreements effected sales and not secured transactions but also held
that securities held in the dealers’ clearing accounts had not been delivered under applicable state law and left
open the issue of whether the purchasers of these securities were unsecured creditors in the insolvency
proceedings. In re Beville, 67 B.R. 557, 609–12, 616, 619 (D.N.J. 1986).
115
See Garbade, supra note 71, at 38–39; In re Beville, 67 B.R. 557, 571 (D.N.J. 1986). The court briefly
described tri-party repurchase agreements in which “the purchased securities are delivered by the dealer to the
clearing firm which acts as an agent for both participants and maintains an account for the dealer and an account
for the repo participant,” relying on the report of Clifford H. Goldman, Executive Vice President of Lehman
Government Securities, Inc., describing, among other things, the mechanics of repo transactions and custodial
arrangements for the safekeeping of securities involved in such transactions. In re Beville, 67 B.R. 557, 571
(D.N.J. 1986).
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likelihood that extending the safe harbors to repurchase agreements would
encourage the continuation of these practices:
Unfortunately, some participants in the repo market have not yet
gotten the message about the basic elements for prudent participation
in that market . . . . Many of these participants neglected the cardinal
rule that investors in repos should arrange for their own custodian to
take delivery of the securities they are acquiring and not merely leave
it to the seller to say that some securities have been earmarked
somewhere for the investor.116

The custodian in this statement refers to a person taking possession of
securities for the benefit of a buyer under a repurchase agreement, that is, a
custodian in the ordinary sense and not in the limited sense of the defined term
of custodian as prepetition liquidator. The other limited uses of the term
custodian in the Senate and House Reports and testimony of witness relating to
the amendments adding safe harbors for Code repurchase agreements used the
term in the same sense.117
Ironically, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
which enacted the safe harbors for Code repurchase agreements and the
extension of the safe harbor for securities contracts to financial institutions, also
revised Section 543 of the Bankruptcy Code governing the requirements for
custodian-liquidators to turnover to the bankruptcy trustee property interests
held by the custodian-liquidator.118 At a hearing before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary on April 6, 1983, Professor Frank R. Kennedy submitted his
views and commented on the views of Professor Vern Countryman criticizing
the amendment included in Senate Bill 455, the predecessor to the safe harbor
provisions of the 1984 Act.119 Unlike the witnesses supporting the expansion of

116
See Bankruptcy Law and Repurchase Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Monopolies and
Commercial Law, of the H. Com. On the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 108–09 (1984) (letter of Peter D. Sternlight,
Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Manager, Domestic Operations System Open
Market Account) (responding to concerns that the expansion of the safe harbors might encourage the
continuation of such lax practices, the letter also noted: “With respect to some elements of good practice, such
as an investor taking delivery of the securities bought under repos, the need for care is no less with or without
exemption from the automatic stay.”).
117
See S. REP. NO. 98-65 at 69, reprinted in 1 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. 15, at 69 (describing
a repo participant to include an entity acting “for the account of one or more other entities (whether as custodian,
trustee, fiduciary, agent or in any other capacity”); S. Hrg. 98-118, supra note 82, at 321, reprinted in 8 REAMS
& WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. no 94 at 321 (statement of Peter D. Sternlight, Executive Vice President Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and Manager, Domestic Operations System Open Market Account).
118
See 11 U.S.C. § 543(d).
119
See S. Hrg. 98-574, supra note 95, at 322, reprinted in 9 REAMS & WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. no. 96
at 329 (statement of Frank R. Kennedy, Professor, University of Michigan School of Law).
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the safe harbors for Code repurchase agreements and securities contracts, these
professors had participated in the initial revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
that culminated in the initial Bankruptcy Code of 1978.120 They presented no
testimony on the expansion of the safe harbors. Also, this hearing did not include
testimony from any witnesses concerning the extension of the safe harbors that
were also part of Senate Bill 445 and that were enacted by the 1984 Act.
This legislative history shows that the drafters of the definition of financial
institution almost certainly meant the term “custodian” to have its ordinary
meaning. Such legislative history, however, would not in my view be sufficient
grounds to ignore the plain language of the statute unless the plain language of
the statute produces a result that is absurd or meaningless. As discussed in the
next Part, the use of the term custodian in the definition of financial institution
is just such a case.
III. PLAIN LANGUAGE AND SCRIVENER’S ERROR: A CUSTODIAN IS NOT
ALWAYS A CUSTODIAN
I favor a textualist approach to statutory interpretation that relies on the
language of the statute.121 There is, however, an exception. A court may depart
from the plain language of the statute if the plain language of the statute produces
an absurdity in light of the rest of the language of the statute that results from a
mistake in the drafting that can be readily fixed.122 Such mistake is known as the
“scrivener’s error.”123 Another rule of interpretation is a presumption that a
particular term in a statute has the same meaning everywhere it appears.124 This
presumption, however, is rebuttable because “drafters more than rarely used the
120
Professor Kennedy was the Executive Director of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States, which submitted a report and draft bill that formed the basis for the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 that enacted the Bankruptcy Code. See S. Hrg. 98-574, supra note 95, at 322, reprinted in 9 REAMS &
WYPSKI, supra note 72, doc. no. 96 at 322 (statement of Professor Frank R. Kennedy). Professors Kennedy and
Countryman were members of a committee of the National Bankruptcy Conference that had submitted a report
that became part of the Report of the House Judiciary Committee for the bill that became the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. See H. REP. NO. 95-595, supra note 62, at 219 (1978).
121
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
56-58 (2012) (summarizing the “Supremacy-of-Text Principle” that “[t]he words of a governing text are of
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means”). In this section, the authors
state that purpose is part of the context, but the purpose must be derived from the text and described as concretely
as possible, and the purpose cannot be used to contradict or supplement the text, “except in the rare case of an
obvious scrivener’s error.” Id. at 56–57.
122
Id. at 234–39 (summarizing the “Absurdity Doctrine[:] A provision may be either disregarded or
judicially corrected as an error (when the correction is textually simple) if failing to do so would result in a
disposition that no reasonable person could approve.”).
123
Id. at 234.
124
Id. at 170.

PLANK_2.1.22

2022]

2/3/2022 1:49 PM

SCRIVENER’S ERROR

85

same word to denote different concepts.”125 A scrivener’s error would rebut the
presumption.
Congress included the word “custodian” in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition
of “financial institution” only for purposes of extending to financial institutions
the safe harbors for securities contracts. Interpreting the word “custodian” in the
definition of “financial institution” by giving it the meaning of the HumptyDumpty defined term “custodian” produces an absurdity that is apparent from
the language of the Bankruptcy Code provisions governing both custodians as
prepetition liquidators and the safe harbors for financial institutions under
securities contracts. A detailed analysis of the definitions of custodian and
financial institution and their uses in the Bankruptcy Code shows the absurdity.
The definition of “financial institution” in Section 101(22) first lists a series
of institutions that are essentially banking institutions and trust companies or
their receivers.126 The definition then states that, when any such entity “is acting
as agent or custodian for a customer (whether or not a ‘customer’, as defined
in section 741) in connection with a securities contract (as defined in section
741)[,]” financial institution also means such customer.127
The three terms “agent,” “custodian,” and “customer” all have well
understood common meanings. The term “agent” is not defined in the
Bankruptcy Code and its ordinary meaning would normally control.128
Although the term “customer” in this definition means a customer in the
ordinary sense of “someone who buys goods or services,”129 at the time of
125
See id. at 170–72 (describing the presumption of consistent use, noting the critics of the presumption,
but stating that the presumption makes sense when used pragmatically).
126
11 U.S.C. § 101(22)(A):

The term “financial institution” means (A) a Federal reserve bank, or an entity that is a
commercial or savings bank, industrial savings bank, savings and loan association, trust
company, federally-insured credit union, or receiver, liquidating agent, or conservator for such
entity and, when any such Federal reserve bank, receiver, liquidating agent, conservator or entity
is acting as agent or custodian for a customer (whether or not a “customer”, as defined in section
741) in connection with a securities contract (as defined in section 741) such customer.

Id.
127

Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the
agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or
otherwise consents so to act.”); Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Large Private Ben. Owners (In re Trib. Co.
Fraudulent Convey. Litig.), 946 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01
(AM. L. INST. 2006) and applying common-law meaning to the term “agent”).
129
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Large Private Ben. Owners, supra note 128, at 79.
128
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enactment of the initial version of this definition in 1984, the Bankruptcy Code
also included a specialized definition of “customer.” This definition, now in
Section 741 of the Bankruptcy Code, in the subtitle governing the liquidation of
stockbrokers, provided that the term “customer” included a customer of a
stockbroker.130 At that time, applying this meaning of “customer” to the
definition of financial institution would not make sense. Banking institutions are
not stockbrokers.131 Trust companies would not normally be stockbrokers. If
they could be stockbrokers, and the definition of customer were limited to trust
companies that were stockbrokers, then the extension of safe harbors to nonfinancial institutions for which a financial institution acts as agent or custodian
would be extremely limited.
The definition of customer in Section 741 uses the term “included” instead
of “means.”132 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress did not mean
to limit this term just to customers of stockholders. Still, this drafting history
illustrates the greater likelihood of scrivener’s errors in later amendments to a
comprehensive regulatory scheme like the Bankruptcy Code that address a
particular, narrow set of problems. In 2006, Congress fixed this problem by
amending the definition of financial institution to add immediately after
“customer” the phrase “(whether or not ‘customer’, as defined in section
741).”133 This amendment confirmed the common definition of customer of a
financial institution.

130

11 U.S.C. § 741(2).
“[C]ustomer” includes—
(A) entity with whom a person deals as principal or agent and that has a claim against such
person on account of a security received, acquired, or held by such person in the ordinary
course of such person’s business as a stockbroker, from or for the securities account or
accounts of such entity—(i) for safekeeping; (ii) with a view to sale; (iii) to cover a
consummated sale; (iv) pursuant to a purchase; (v) as collateral under a security agreement;
or (vi) for the purpose of effecting registration of transfer; and
(B) entity that has a claim against a person arising out of—(i) a sale or conversion of a
security received, acquired, or held as specified in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; or
(ii) a deposit of cash, a security, or other property with such person for the purpose of
purchasing or selling a security.

Id.
131
Except for certain trust companies, the banking institutions referenced in the definition of “financial
institution” are not subject to the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore the provisions for stockbroker liquidation
would not apply. See id. §§ 109(b)(2)–(3)(A). See generally Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking:
Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 709–13 (2000).
132
11 U.S.C. § 741(2).
133
Financial Netting Improvements Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-390, § 5(a)(1)(A)(ii), 120 Stat. 2692,
2695 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101(22)(A)(1)) (quoted supra note 126).
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A. The Absurdity from Applying the Definition of Custodian to Financial
Institutions
In contrast with the initial reference to agent and the revised reference to
customer in their ordinary meanings, the term “custodian” was defined in 1978
to mean a prepetition liquidator for the benefit of creditors of a person that later
became a debtor in bankruptcy.134 The specific purpose for this definition is
apparent from the language of the Bankruptcy Code as well as its legislative
history. In 1984, Congress added the definition of financial institution to the
Bankruptcy Code for a different, specific purpose. This purpose is expressed in
the language of the amendments: to extend the safe harbor for securities
contracts beyond stockbrokers to (i) banking institutions and trust companies
and (ii) entities that were not banking institutions or trust companies if they used
banking institutions or trust companies as agents or custodians in connection
with a securities contract. Contrasting the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
defining the term “custodian” to mean a prepetition liquidator with the
provisions extending safe harbors to financial institutions shows that Congress
could not have intended the term “custodian” in the definition of financial
institution to mean a prepetition liquidator.
A custodian as defined means a prepetition liquidator that obtains custody
and control of some or all the interests in property of a person that later becomes
a debtor in bankruptcy for the limited purpose of effecting a pre-bankruptcy
liquidation of those property interests for the benefit of some or all of that
person’s creditors.135
A common form of prepetition liquidator included in the definition of
custodian is an assignee pursuant to a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors, a common form of state insolvency resolution law that predates the
introduction of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898136 but is still used under the
Bankruptcy Code.137 Under such a general assignment, a person that owes debts
makes an assignment of all of the person’s interests in property to an assignee

134

11 U.S.C. § 101(11), quoted supra in text accompany note 61.
See supra text accompanying notes 61–62 (quoting the definition and the legislative report on the
meaning and purpose of the definition).
136
Melanie Rovner Cohen & Joanna L. Challacombe, Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors—A
Contemporary Alternative for Corporations, 2 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 269, 269–70 (1990).
137
See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 1–24 (McKinney 2021) (general assignment for the benefit of
creditors); Rovner Cohen & Challacombe, supra note 136; David S. Kupetz, Assignment for the Benefit of
Creditors: Exit Vehicle of Choice for Many Dot-Com, Technology, and Other Troubled Enterprises, 11 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 71, 72 (2001); Robert Richards & Nancy Ross, Practical Issues in Assignment for the Benefit
of Creditors, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 5–7 (2009).
135
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that takes complete possession and control of the assignor’s property interests
and liquidates them for the benefit of the assignor’s creditors.138 Another
prepetition liquidator included in the definition of custodian is a receiver that is
directed to obtain possession or control of either specific property interests139 or
as much of the property interests of a person that owes debts for the benefit of
specific creditors to enforce a lien on or a judgment relating to those property
interests.140
Once a prepetition liquidator takes possession of or control over the property
interests of the assignor or obligor, the assignor or obligor no longer retains any
interest in or control over the property interests held by the prepetition liquidator
other than the right to any potential surplus remaining after payment of the
relevant creditors.141 If the assignor or obligor later becomes a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code, Section 543 provides that a custodian-liquidator may be
required to transfer those property interests to the bankruptcy trustee (which
would include the debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 reorganization case)142
for inclusion in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.143
138
N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 3–4, 12–15, 19 (McKinney 2021); Rovner Cohen & Challacombe, supra
note 136, at 270; Kupetz, supra note 137, at 73; Richards & Ross, supra note 137, at 5–7.
139
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5106 (MCKINNEY 2018) (court appointment of a receiver of property subject
of an action in order to enforce a judgment or to dispose of the property). See generally GRANT NELSON ET AL.,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 4.33–4.42 at 221–47 (6th ed. 2015).
140
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228 (MCKINNEY 2018) (appointment of receiver to administer, collect, or sell
any real or personal property in which a judgment creditor has an interest to satisfy a judgment in favor of a
judgment creditor). See generally DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES,
EQUITY, RESTITUTION 134 (3d ed. 2018).
141
See supra notes 135–139 and accompanying text.
142
11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (providing that, with certain exceptions, a debtor in possession has all the rights
and powers and shall perform all the functions and duties of a bankruptcy trustee).
143
Id. § 543(a)–(d).
(a) A custodian with knowledge of the commencement of a case under this title concerning
the debtor may not make any disbursement from, or take any action in the administration of,
property of the debtor, proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such property, or property
of the estate, in the possession, custody, or control of such custodian, except such action as is
necessary to preserve such property.
(b) A custodian shall—
(1) deliver to the trustee any property of the debtor held by or transferred to such custodian,
or proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such property, that is in such custodian’s
possession, custody, or control on the date that such custodian acquires knowledge of the
commencement of the case; and (2) file an accounting of any property of the debtor, or proceeds,
product, offspring, rents, or profits of such property, that, at any time, came into the possession,
custody, or control of such custodian.
(c) The court, after notice and a hearing, shall—(1) protect all entities to which a custodian
has become obligated with respect to such property or proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or
profits of such property; (2) provide for the payment of reasonable compensation for services
rendered and costs and expenses incurred by such custodian; and (3) surcharge such custodian,
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The definition of the property of the estate under Section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code necessitates Section 543. Under Section 541(a)(1), the
property of the estate consists of all of the interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case.144 If a custodian-liquidator had taken
possession or control over the property of a person before that person becomes
a debtor in bankruptcy, the interests in property held by the liquidator-custodian
would not be property interests of the debtor as of the commencement of the
case. Accordingly, those property interests would not be included in the property
of the estate under Section 541(a)(1) when the person becomes a debtor in
bankruptcy.145 Instead, consistent with the primary definition of property of the
estate in Section 541(a)(1), Section 541(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that property of the estate includes property recovered by the bankruptcy trustee
from a custodian-liquidator under Section 543.146 The committee reports for the
initial Bankruptcy Code also stated that Section 543 was intended to bring into
property of the estate property interests formerly owned by the debtor but held
by the custodian-liquidator.147 In addition, the Bankruptcy Code provided for the
other than an assignee for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors that was appointed or took
possession more than 120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, for any improper or
excessive disbursement, other than a disbursement that has been made in accordance with
applicable law or that has been approved, after notice and a hearing, by a court of competent
jurisdiction before the commencement of the case under this title.
(d) After notice and hearing, the bankruptcy court (1) may excuse compliance with
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section if the interests of creditors and, if the debtor is not
insolvent, of equity security holders would be better served by permitting a custodian to continue
in possession, custody, or control of such property, and (2) shall excuse compliance with
subsections (a) and (b)(1) of this section if the custodian is an assignee for the benefit of the
debtor’s creditors that was appointed or took possession more than 120 days before the date of
the filing of the petition, unless compliance with such subsections is necessary to prevent fraud
or injustice.
Id.
144

Id. § 541(a)(1).
See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY L. REV.
1193, 1193–95 (1998) (noting that because the Bankruptcy Code adopts the legal understanding of “property”
not as the property item but the interests in the property item, resolving the claims and rights of a debtor, the
creditors, and third parties in bankruptcy requires a rigorous analysis of the specific interests of the debtor in
property, including (1) distinguishing between the property item and the different property interest interests in
the property item and (2) identifying the scope and substance of the property interests).
146
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (providing that property of the estate also includes “[a]ny interest in property
that the trustee recovers under section . . . 543 . . . of this title”).
147
S. REP. NO. 95-989 at 84–85 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5870–71; H. REP. NO. 95595 at 370 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6326. The Senate report described Section 543:
145

This section requires a custodian appointed before the bankruptcy case to deliver to the trustee
and to account for property that has come into his possession, custody, or control as a custodian.
“Property of the debtor” in section (a) includes property that was property of the debtor at the
time the custodian took the property, but the title to which passed to the custodian.
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payment of the custodian’s fees and included other provisions related to the
initial appointment of the custodian.
Because of the consequences of the appointment of a custodian-liquidator
for some or all of the debtor’s prepetition assets, applying the defined term for
custodian as prepetition liquidator in the definition of financial institution makes
no sense and serves no purpose. Applying this definition of custodian-liquidator
would negate the extension of the safe harbor for securities contracts to nonfinancial entities that use a banking institution or trust company as an ordinary
custodian.
Recall the three safe harbors for financial institutions under a repurchase
agreement that is a securities contract. Under Section 555, a financial institution
may immediately exercise its contractual rights to liquidate, terminate, or
accelerate a securities contract if the counterparty became a debtor in
bankruptcy.148 Under Section 362(a)(6), a financial institution may exercise its
contractual right under any security agreement or its set off or netting rights
related to a security contract notwithstanding the automatic stay.149 Under
Section 546(e), the bankruptcy trustee may not avoid most prepetition transfers
to the financial institution.150
The most common form of a repurchase agreement that is a securities
contract is a contract by which the seller sells securities or mortgage loans to a
buyer for a purchase price and promises to repurchase the securities or mortgage
loans for a repurchase price.151 The safe harbors protect the buyer or the seller
of the securities or mortgage loans if the other party becomes a debtor in
bankruptcy. As a practical matter, however, because the buyer is parting with its
funds and obtaining the securities or mortgage loans against a promise of the
seller to repurchase, the buyer will insist on the benefits of the safe harbors.
Nevertheless, if the buyer defaults by initiating insolvency proceedings, a
financial institution that is the seller will also be entitled to the benefits of the
safe harbors.

S. REP. NO. 95-989 at 84–85 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5870–71.
148
11 U.S.C. § 555, discussed supra Part I.B.
149
Id. § 362(b)(6), discussed supra Part I.B.
150
Id. § 546(e), discussed supra Part I.B.
151
See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (describing the provisions of the SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKT.
ASS’N, Master Repurchase Agreement (Sept. 1, 1996) 1, ¶ 1, https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
08/MRA_Agreement.pdf.
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A party to a securities contract retains rights with respect to the securities
contract and the related securities or mortgage loans.152 Therefore, a nonfinancial buyer that qualifies as a deemed financial institution because an actual
financial institution acts as its agent or ordinary custodian may exercise those
rights permitted by Sections 555 or 362(b)(6) or receive those transfers under
Section 546(e) without risk of avoidance. However, if the term “custodian” in
the definition of financial institution means the defined custodian-liquidator,
then the non-financial buyer, even if it were to qualify as a “customer” of the
custodian-liquidator (a separate and questionable proposition), will not have the
benefit of any of these safe harbors.
A review of all of the potential applications of safe the harbors provisions to
a repurchase agreement that is a securities contract will illustrate this point. To
begin, assume that on Day 1 two non-financial entities that are eligible to be
debtors in bankruptcy enter into a repurchase agreement for the sale and
repurchase of securities or mortgage loans. Until one of the parties becomes a
debtor in bankruptcy, the safe harbors have no relevance. If one party does
become a debtor in bankruptcy, the other party will not be entitled to the safe
harbors for securities contracts if that party is not the customer of a financial
institution acting as agent or custodian. The non-debtor party will not be able to
liquidate, terminate or accelerate the repurchase agreement, to exercise any
rights under a security agreement without relief from the automatic stay or to
receive protection from avoidance of any pre-petition transfers to it.
The following discussion will first address the variety of results if one of the
parties to the repurchase agreement, entered into on Day 1, makes a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors to an assignee that is a banking institution
or trust company, that is, an actual financial institution. To simplify the
discussion, I will assume that the buyer makes the general assignment. The
following analysis would be substantially the same if we reversed the roles.
Initial Scenario – General Assignment. Assume that on Day 30, the buyer
makes the general assignment. The general assignment would vest in the
assignee (an actual financial institution) all of the rights that the buyer had under
the repurchase agreement. A general assignment would normally be an event of
152
A party to a contract has both the right to performance by the counterparty and the right to remedies
for breach of the contract as well as the obligation to perform its promises under the contract. A market
repurchase agreement will give (a) the seller rights under the contract, including the right to repurchase the
transferred assets and remedies for breach of the seller’s obligations, and (b) the buyer the rights to the transferred
assets and remedies for breach of the seller’s obligations. See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKT. ASS’N, Master
Repurchase Agreement (Sept. 1, 1996) 3–4, https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MRA_
Agreement.pdf.
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default under the repurchase agreement,153 and the seller as the counterparty
would normally have the right under non-bankruptcy law to terminate the
repurchase agreement immediately and exercise its remedies. Such remedies
would include demanding return of the relevant securities or mortgage loans or
damages.154 The seller would be required to look primarily to the assignee for
the benefit of creditors to recover the relevant assets or damages and not to the
buyer. No safe harbors are involved.
First Variation. Assume that the seller did not terminate the repurchase
agreement after the buyer’s general assignment on Day 30 but instead became a
debtor in bankruptcy on Day 60. At that point, if the buyer would be considered
a “customer” of the “custodian” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code, that is, the
assignee under the general assignment, the buyer would become a financial
institution that would be entitled to terminate the repurchase agreement under
Section 555, to exercise any rights under a security agreement or any set off
rights in connection with the repurchase agreement under Section 362(a)(6), and
to receive protection from avoidance of transfers made to the buyer after the
general assignment on Day 30 under 546(e).
However, because of the assignment for the benefit of creditors, the buyer
would no longer have any rights under the repurchase agreement or any related
security agreement, including a right to terminate, or any right to receive the
repurchase price for the relevant securities or mortgage loans, and it would not
be entitled to any payments made by the seller after the assignment. Those rights
had been assigned to the assignee.
Hence, deeming the non-financial customer as buyer to be a financial
institution because of the appointment of a financial institution as a defined
custodian-liquidator renders this part of the definition a meaningless absurdity,
a nullity. The buyer will never be able to use or to obtain the benefits of the safe
harbors to terminate the securities contract, to liquidate the related securities or
mortgage loans, to obtain the repurchase price, or to receive protection from an
avoidance action. Deeming the buyer to be a financial institution because an
actual financial institution became an assignee for the benefit of creditors—a
custodian-liquidator—has no effect. The result would be the same if no clause
were added to the definition of “financial institution” deeming a non-financial
153
See id. at 7–9, ¶ 11 (providing that an “Act of Insolvency with respect to Seller or Buyer” is one of the
“Events of Default”); id. at 1, ¶ 2(a) (defining an “Act of Insolvency” with respect to any party to include “the
making by such party of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors”).
154
See id. at 7–9, ¶ 11 (providing for remedies for one party after another party commits an event of
default).
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customer to be a financial institution if an actual financial institution were acting
as a custodian for the non-financial customer.
Second Variation. Assume that, instead of becoming a debtor after the
general assignment by the buyer, the seller became a debtor in bankruptcy on
Day 15 before the general assignment by the buyer. The buyer is not at this time
a deemed financial institution and is not entitled to the safe harbors. When the
buyer makes a general assignment on Day 30, it becomes a deemed financial
institution if the assignee is the custodian. As discussed above, however, the
buyer will not have any right to the benefit of the safe harbors. Those rights
belong to the assignee. Again, deeming the buyer to be a financial institution
because an actual financial institution became an assignee for the benefit of
creditors—a custodian-liquidator—is a nullity. It has no effect.
Third Variation—Custodian-Liquidator for Less Than All of Property.
Assume that the custodian-liquidator obtains custody of only a portion of the
buyer’s property interests. This example presents two alternative situations.
Under the first alternative, the custodian-liquidator liquidator does not obtain
custody of the buyer’s rights under the repurchase agreement or the securities or
mortgage loans sold under the repurchase agreement. In this case, the safe
harbors are not available to the buyer. If the rights under the securities contract
or the related purchased securities, mortgage loans or cash are not included in
the custodial liquidation, the safe harbor would not apply. For a non-financial
entity to be deemed a financial institution, a financial institution must act as
“custodian for a customer . . . in connection with a securities contract.”155 If a
financial institution is appointed as a receiver, say, to take possession and control
of mortgaged property owned by the buyer but subject to foreclosure or some
other action, the appointment of the financial institution as a defined custodianliquidator would not confer on the buyer the status of a deemed financial
institution because the actual financial institution is acting as custodian in
connection with the mortgaged real estate and not as custodian in connection the
securities contract.
Alternatively, if a financial institution as receiver could be appointed to take
charge of the buyer’s rights under the repurchase agreement, then the analysis
described in the first and second variations applies. The buyer would have no
ability to exercise its rights or receive any protection under the repurchase
agreement. The custodian-liquidator would hold those rights. The custodian may
exercise those rights and receive those protections because it is an actual
155

11 U.S.C. § 101(22)(A), quoted supra note 126.
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financial institution. Again, defining custodian to mean a custodian-liquidator
makes the safe harbors unavailable to the non-financial buyer to the repurchase
agreement. In either case, the language in the definition of financial institution
deeming the buyer to be a financial institution because an actual financial
institution became a receiver or other custodian-liquidator for part of the seller’s
property interests is a nullity. It has no effect.
Fourth Variation—Custodian Entering into a Repurchase Agreement. If
person makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors on Day 0, it is
unlikely as a practical matter that the person would be able to enter into a
repurchase agreement as a buyer or seller after that date. Having assigned all of
its property interests to the assignee, it should not have any funds by which it
could purchase securities as a buyer or any securities to sell as a seller.
More importantly, even if that assignor could enter into a repurchase
agreement as a buyer or a seller after the general assignment to an assignee that
was a financial institution, and the counterparty later became a debtor in
bankruptcy, the rights of the buyer or seller under the repurchase agreement or
the assets transferred—securities or mortgage loans to the buyer or funds to the
seller—would not be included in the assets under the control of the custodianliquidator. Therefore, the status of the assignee as a financial institution and
defined custodian-liquidator would not make the buyer a financial institution. In
this case, the financial institution would not be acting as the custodian-liquidator
in connection with the repurchase agreement entered into after the general
assignment.
Similarly, if the custodian-liquidator took possession or control of only a
portion of the buyer’s or seller’s property interests—say, mortgaged real
estate—before either buyer or seller entered into a repurchase agreement, the
same analysis applies. The custodian-liquidator of that mortgaged property
would not be acting as custodian under the repurchase agreement.
Finally, if the terms of the appointment of the relevant custodian-liquidator,
whether as an assignee for the benefit of creditors or a receiver of less than all
of the obligor’s property interests, provided that after acquired property interests
of the assignor or the obligor became subject to the possession or control of the
custodian-liquidator, then the results described under the First through Third
Variations would apply. There is no instance in which the portion of the
definition of “financial institution” making a non-financial customer of an actual
financial institution a deemed financial institution if the actual financial
institution became a custodian-liquidator has any effect. This part of the
definition is a nullity.
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B. An Easy Fix
The use of the defined term “custodian” in the definition of “financial
institution” is a drafting error that produces an absurd interpretation. There are
several easy fixes that qualify this drafting error as a true scrivener’s error. One
fix would be to modify judicially the definition of “custodian” in Section
101(11) to exclude its application to the definition of “financial institution.” This
approach is used, for example, in Section 101(20) (“The term “farmer” means
(except when such term appears in the term “family farmer”) . . . .), Section
101(35)(B) (“The term ‘insured depository institution’ . . . (B) includes an
insured credit union (except in the case of paragraphs (21B) and (33)(A) of this
subsection”); and Section 101(52) (“The term ‘State’ includes the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining who may be a
debtor under chapter 9 of this title”).
The other fix is to modify the term custodian in the definition of financial
institution in Section 101(22)(A) by adding immediately after the word
“custodian” the phrase “whether or not a “custodian”, as defined in section
101(11).”156 This approach appears in the definition of financial institution in
the case of the term “customer”.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between the general understanding of the meaning of the term
“custodian” in the definition of financial institution as an entity that took
possession and control of property for another and the specific definition of a
custodian as a prepetition liquidator of a debtor’s former assets has been around
since 1984. This conflict first became public in the latter part of 2020.157 Before
this time, parties had structured repurchase agreements that are securities
contracts with non-financial institutions by having a banking institution or trust
company act as a custodian. In doing so, they have relied on the ordinary
meaning of custodian. This reliance illustrates the problems that follow from a
statute in which a term that has a well-known, ordinary meaning is given an

156
In Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Pappa, discussed supra note 20, after noting that the transferee
did not argue that the use of the defined term, custodian, was unclear, absurd or ambiguous, the court noted that
the plaintiff argued that Congress could have used this technique to make clear that the custodian in the definition
of financial institution in Section 101(22)(A) was not the term defined in Section 101(11) of the Bankruptcy
Code, as it had done with the term customer. Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Pappa (In re Greektown
Holdings), 621 B.R. 797, 836 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2020).
157
See id. at 797, discussed supra note 20.
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unusual or misleading definition. Both drafters and readers of statutes often are
not aware of the unusual meaning of the defined term.
Courts should not lightly disregard the language of the statute as enacted nor
look outside of the statute for interpretative guidance except in the case of real
ambiguity. Nevertheless, courts should correct drafting errors when the resulting
application of the statute as written contradicts the plain purpose of the statute
as demonstrated by the language of the statute. A custodian under the definition
of financial institution in Section 101(22)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code is not a
custodian in Section 101(11). Unless or until Congress corrects this scrivener’s
error, courts should give the word custodian in the definition of financial
institution its ordinary meaning.

